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[T]he public has a right to every man’s evidence, a maxim which in its proper 
sense cannot be denied.1
-Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, during debate in Parliament, 1742 
 
[Edmund] Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but in the Report-
ers’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.  
It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact,—very momentous 
to us in these times. . . . Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, 
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, 
in all acts of authority.
2
-Thomas Carlyle, 1840 
 
On July 6, 2005, Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times reporter 
Judith Miller was jailed for refusing to disclose the identity of a confi-
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1 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192, at 71 ( John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (citing 
12 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1742) 643, 693).  This maxim has also long been present in the 
American legal system:  “It is . . . beyond controversy that one of the duties which the 
citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending 
its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned.”  Blackmer v. 
United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.). 
2 THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, & THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 141 
(Michael K. Goldberg et al. eds., 1993) (1840). 
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dential source to a federal grand jury,3 making her one of a number 
of journalists imprisoned recently4 for adhering to the canons of their 
profession.5  When prominent members of the media are jailed for 
adhering to principles that have long been an integral part of investi-
gative reporting, it raises a question about the relationship between 
our judicial system and our democratic system of governance.  Should 
the state’s interest in mandating compliance with the rule of law out-
weigh the press’s role as a Fourth Estate and check on the power of 
government? 
This conflict between the freedom of the press and the needs of 
the judiciary has been present since colonial times.6  While the press 
seeks to gather and disseminate information, free from government 
intervention, the judicial system employs all possible means to find the 
truth.  Only on rare occasions do we prevent the judiciary from ob-
taining the evidence it seeks on its truth-finding mission, and on these 
occasions the countervailing need is always that of a higher societal 
interest.   
The constitutional roles of the press and the judiciary are at odds 
when a court issues a subpoena to a journalist, and this centuries-old 
3 Adam Liptak, Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, 
at A1. 
4 See Reporter’s Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Paying the Price:  A Recent Cen-
sus of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (listing the reporters who have been jailed over the past 
twenty years for refusing to testify). 
5 See Am. Soc’y of Newspaper Editors, Statement of Principles, art. VI (1975), avail-
able at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (“Pledges of 
confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs . . . .”).  The Statement of 
Principles was originally adopted in 1922 as the Canons of Journalism.  Id. 
 Bob Woodward, in his book about the Watergate scandal and “Deep Throat” Mark 
Felt, writes that promises of confidentiality played a crucial role in bringing the scandal 
to public attention:  “There needed to be a model out there where people could come 
forward or speak when contacted, knowing they would be protected.  It was a matter of 
my work, a matter of honor.”  BOB WOODWARD, THE SECRET MAN 185 (2005). 
6 See Julie M. Zampa, Case Note, Journalist’s Privilege:  When Deprivation is a Benefit, 
108 YALE L.J. 1449, 1449 (1999) (“Debate over the issue of a journalist’s privilege not 
to disclose information and source identities to the courts predates the United States 
Constitution.”).  Indeed, Benjamin Franklin and John Peter Zenger had run-ins with 
situations analogous to those raised by today’s journalist’s privilege.  See MAURICE VAN 
GERPEN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND THE PRESS:  THE CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 
VERSUS THE LAW’S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIAL NEWS SOURCE EVIDENCE 5-6 (1979) (de-
tailing Franklin’s and Zenger’s cases). 
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tension has come to a head.7  The circumstances surrounding Judith 
Miller’s jailing8 demonstrate the compelling need for the Supreme 
Court to recognize a journalist’s privilege. 
This Comment maintains that the need of the press to keep cer-
tain confidences is one of the few instances involving societal interests 
of greater import than the judiciary’s search for the truth.  Therefore, 
journalists should have a privilege, grounded in the common law and 
derived from the First Amendment, to refuse to answer subpoenas is-
sued by judicial authorities.  Further, the Supreme Court, under the 
authority vested in the judiciary by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 
should be the entity that recognizes the privilege. 
The state of the law in this area has changed drastically since 1972 
when the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg v. Hayes9 that journal-
ists, like other citizens, have a duty to provide testimony to grand ju-
ries.  Almost every state and federal circuit now provides at least some 
type of statutory, common law, or constitutional protection for jour-
nalists.10  In addition, the need today for the privilege is even more 
urgent than it was thirty years ago. 
The area of journalist’s privilege law is necessarily large, and this 
Comment will not attempt to explore every facet.11  Instead, the 
Comment will focus on the jurisprudence and theory underlying the 
7 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 1003 (D.C. Cir.) 
(Tatel, J., concurring) (noting that the debate over a privilege for journalists 
“[r]epresent[s] two equally fundamental principles—rule of law and free speech”), 
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); STEPHEN BATES, THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE, THEN 
AND NOW 14 (2000) (noting that both sides—prosecutors and journalists—see them-
selves as “exercising constitutional authority to serve the public interest. . . . The prose-
cutor thinks he is doing the people’s business by issuing a subpoena; the journalist 
thinks he is doing the people’s business by refusing to comply”); VAN GERPEN, supra 
note 6, at 3 (“In a constitutional democracy there are at least two principles that are 
assumed.  One is that the public has the right to know what is happening in the politi-
cal system.  The other is that the public through its prosecutors and defense counsel-
ors has the right to everyman’s evidence.”). 
8 For a description of the circumstances leading to Miller’s jailing, see Judith Miller, 
397 F.3d at 965-69; Liptak, supra note 3, at A1; Lorne Manly & Adam Liptak, At Leak 
Inquiry’s Center, a Circumspect Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at A18; REPORTER’S 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SPECIAL REPORT:  REPORTERS AND FEDERAL SUB-
POENAS ( July 7, 2005), http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html (keeping an 
up-to-date account of actions in the case and useful related links).  For a quick (and 
opinionated) background of the case, see Hendrik Hertzberg, Comment (Editorial), 
The Matt and Judy Show, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2005, at 27. 
9 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Branzburg. 
10 See infra Part II.B (giving each state’s stance on the issue); infra Part II.A (giving 
each circuit’s stance on the issue). 
11 See infra Part I.C for a discussion of the contours of the privilege. 
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journalist’s privilege and how the judicial and media arenas have sig-
nificantly changed since Branzburg was decided.  It will then argue that 
the need for uniformity in the field is overwhelming, and that the best 
means to this end is Supreme Court recognition of a privilege for 
journalists, grounded in Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
Part I explores the background of the controversy, relevant First 
Amendment theory, and issues associated with testimonial privileges.  
Part II finds support for a journalist’s privilege in federal case law, 
state shield laws and court decisions, and fellow common law jurisdic-
tions’ actions.  Part III argues on four separate grounds why a privi-
lege for journalists is necessary in today’s media and legal atmosphere.  
Part IV analyzes why judges are traditionally opposed to the creation 
of a journalist’s privilege and focuses specifically on the Supreme 
Court’s antagonism toward the issue in Branzburg.  Finally, Part V 
makes the case for Supreme Court recognition of the privilege under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Theory 
The phrase “freedom of the press”—regardless of the particular 
brand of First Amendment jurisprudence to which one subscribes—
can support the creation of a privilege protecting reporters from hav-
ing to reveal the nature of confidential information they received 
from sources who wished to remain anonymous. 
Inevitably, much of the debate surrounding a potential journalist’s 
privilege centers on the conception of “freedom of the press” as em-
bodied in the First Amendment.12  Up until at least the early twentieth 
12 This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should recognize a privilege for 
journalists grounded in the common law (as prescribed by FED. R. EVID. 501).  However, 
the subsequent discussion of the First Amendment is relevant for three important rea-
sons:  first, the First Amendment plays a large role in prescribing the role of the press 
as a check on government power in our democratic system of government; second, a 
prospective journalist’s privilege has until recently been discussed purely in constitu-
tional terms; and third, the constitutional approach has had a significant impact on 
the common law in this area.  Indeed, the constitutional and common law approaches 
to the journalist’s privilege have been confused almost to the point where they are in-
separable.  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 977 (D.C. Cir.) 
(Sentelle, J., concurring) (“[T]he Branzburg Court repeatedly discussed the [ journal-
ist’s] privilege question in common law terms as well as constitutional.”), cert. denied, 
125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Lawrence J. Mullen, Comment, Developments in the News Media 
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century, the First Amendment’s protection of “freedom of the press” 
and “freedom of speech” was thought by most commentators to be 
identical.13  Professor Melville Nimmer suggests that the Framers in-
cluded both phrases in the Amendment simply to ensure protection 
of all types of expression, both written and oral.14
If “freedom of the press” means nothing more than “freedom of 
written speech,” then the constitutional argument for special privi-
leges for journalists in court proceedings is indeed weak.  Ordinary 
citizens are required to give testimony, and journalists cannot hide 
behind their profession to shirk their responsibility.  If, instead, “free-
dom of the press” has a meaning separate from “freedom of 
speech”—say, “freedom of the media,” or “freedom of newspapers, 
broadcasters, etc.”—then journalists should arguably be afforded at 
least some protection in court proceedings. 
Privilege:  The Qualified Constitutional Approach Becoming Common Law, 33 ME. L. REV. 
401, 406 (1981) (arguing that courts have begun to merge the constitutional and 
common law arguments for a journalist’s privilege, leading to what the authors of Rule 
501 envisioned:  a common law privilege developing in the courts).  In this respect, a 
federal common law journalist’s privilege resembles what Professor Monaghan termed 
“constitutional common law,” Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1975), and has been the 
subject of spirited academic debate.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 823-24 (5th ed. 2003) 
(outlining Monaghan’s proposal and challenges to it); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. 
Welch, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1126 (1978) 
(criticizing Monaghan’s argument and suggesting an alternative theory of judicial re-
view); Kevin McNamee, Comment, Do As I Say and Not As I Do:  Dickerson, Constitu-
tional Common Law, and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239, 1245 
(2001) (suggesting limits on the constitutional common law to avoid infringing on 
federalism and separation of powers). 
 Therefore, because the First Amendment heavily informs the common law in this 
area, the argument developed in this Comment, though grounded in the common law, 
necessarily invokes First Amendment principles and language. 
13 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 456 
(1983) (“Through most of our history . . . the terms freedom of speech and freedom of 
press have been used more or less interchangeably.”); Anthony L. Fargo, Tell Me No 
Secrets:  The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information 69 (2000) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review) (“There was no evidence through the first half of the nineteenth 
century that the Framers meant anything more by ‘the freedom of the press’ than that 
individuals’ ability to express their sentiments in writing should be free.”). 
14 See Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy:  What 
Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 639 (1975) (“[T]he reference to 
‘speech’ might [have] been construed to protect only oral expression, so . . . the refer-
ence to the ‘press’ was added in order to explicitly protect written expression.”). 
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1.  What Did “Freedom of the Press” Mean? 
Most early commentators equated “freedom of the press” with 
speech.  Blackstone was adamant that the press deserved no special 
protection, and in fact argued that government should have the 
power to regulate the press.15  The Blackstonian view had a tremen-
dous influence on the common law of press rights,16 but has been 
strongly criticized in the last half-century.17  Leading American schol-
ars in the 1920s tried to distance the American common law on free-
dom of speech and press from its English predecessor.18
“Freedom of the press” began to take on a meaning of its own 
around the time the press became more institutionalized.  At the time 
of the country’s founding, the “press” consisted of family newspa-
pers.19  By the early twentieth century, the occupation of “journalist” 
15 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *142, *150-53.  Blackstone thought 
that society needed to be protected from “abuse” of freedom of the press, not that the 
press needed to be protected from abuse by government.  Id.  Some early American 
commentators, though, were of the opposite opinion.  See, for example, a letter writ-
ten by the Continental Congress in 1794 to Quebec explaining some of the purposes 
behind the Revolutionary War.  Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, reprinted in 1 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 221, 223 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) 
(arguing that a free press is necessary, in part, to shame oppressive public officials 
“into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs”).  Professor Anderson 
notes that the letter’s “view of the purposes of freedom of the press was not limited to 
scrutiny of government, but also included broader intellectual and cultural objectives.”  
Anderson, supra note 13, at 464. 
16 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH 9-10 (1920) (recognizing Blackstonian 
thought in American free speech theory). 
17 See James A. Guest & Alan L. Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen 
Concealing Their Sources, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 18, 30 (1969) (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the first amendment guarantee gives wider protection than what was 
available in England in the late eighteenth century.”); Fargo, supra note 13, at 125 (ar-
guing that by the 1960s, the Blackstonian view of free speech, which relied on English 
common law, was out of favor in U.S. courts, and freedom of the press began to de-
velop a meaning separate from freedom of speech). 
18 See, e.g., 2 HENRY SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 521-
22 (1921) (arguing that one of the aims of the American Revolution was to rid the 
Colonies of “the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press”); see also 
Fargo, supra note 13, at 105-110 (noting that Schofield, Chafee, and Justice Holmes 
began in the 1920s to accord the press significantly more protection).  For opposition 
to this civil libertarian perspective, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH:  
THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 1-3 (1991) (disagreeing with the 
civil libertarian theories of Chafee, Meiklejohn, and Emerson, and even claiming that 
Chafee “deliberately manipulated history and theory”). 
19 See Fargo, supra note 13, at 71 (noting that prior to the 1830s most newspapers 
were family businesses, and, therefore, it was implausible to think of “the press” as an 
institution distinct from individuals). 
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was clearly a profession, and the “press” began to more firmly occupy 
a place in the American constitutional scheme.20
2.  What Should “Freedom of the Press” Mean?21
Each of the theories discussed in this Part approaches the phrase 
“freedom of the press” from a different angle, suggesting its impor-
tance for the press, for society, or for government.  Yet in these com-
peting First Amendment theories there is a striking similarity:  each 
allows for recognition of a privilege for journalists. 
Some scholars argue that “freedom of the press” should be con-
ceptually separate from “freedom of speech,” and that the former ac-
cords the press distinct rights—which are more encompassing—than 
those associated with speech.  For instance, Justice Stewart relies on 
the role that the press plays in American political society to bolster his 
argument that press freedoms are greater than speech freedoms.22  
Similarly, Justice Brennan argues that the most appropriate way to 
20 See David S. Allen, The Institutional Press and Professionalization:  Defining the Press 
Clause in Journalist’s Privilege Cases, 34 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 49, 50 (1996) (discussing the 
professionalization of the press that occurred by the 1920s). 
21 Professor David Anderson notes that several First Amendment scholars, in 
evaluating today’s conception of the Press Clause, largely disregard what the Framers 
might have meant. 
Two of our most prominent first amendment theorists, Chafee and Emerson, 
warn us that the historical inquiry is futile, either because “the framers had no 
very clear idea as to what they meant,” see Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. 
REV. 891, 898 (1949), or because it is impossible at this late date to ascertain 
what they meant, see Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First 
Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1977).  Our most prominent first amend-
ment historian, Leonard Levy, believes it is possible to ascertain what the 
Framers meant (to wit:  very little), but tells us it does not matter, that we are 
not bound by their understanding anyway.  See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
SION:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (1960). 
Anderson, supra note 13, at 461 n.38. 
22 See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (“If the 
Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of expression, it would be a consti-
tutional redundancy.”).  The “institutional autonomy” argument, first articulated by 
Justice Stewart, supports the view that the press should be treated differently than the 
general public.  See id. at 633 (“The publishing business is, in short, the only organized 
private business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”); see also TIMOTHY W. 
GLEASON, THE WATCHDOG CONCEPT:  THE PRESS AND THE COURTS IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 112 (1990) (“[F]reedom of the press is the only individual right in 
the federal Bill of Rights with an organized, profit-making, institutional constituency.  
The watchdog concept of freedom of the press is a direct result of that institutional 
constituency.”). 
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view the First Amendment is through the “structural” model,23 which 
“significantly extends the umbrella of the press’ constitutional protec-
tions.”24  Indeed, C. Edwin Baker worries that the government will in-
fringe on the press’s rights unless the press is given “special institu-
tional protection.”25  And Randall Bezanson posits that a “distinct and 
coherent set of principles should apply to free expression claims by 
the press.”26
In contrast to the view that press freedoms are greater than 
speech freedoms, some commentators argue that “freedom of the 
press” does not provide the institutional press with any rights not 
available to ordinary citizens.  Most courts have endorsed this view.27  
23 Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States (Oct. 17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176-77 (1979).  While 
the “structural” model “focuses on the relationship of the press to the communicative 
functions required by our democratic beliefs,” id. at 177, the “speech” model maintains 
that the First Amendment simply “prohibit[s] any interference with freedom of ex-
pression.”  Id. at 176. 
24 Id. at 177. 
25 C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U.  
MIAMI L. REV. 819, 853 (1980). 
26 Randall P. Bezanson, The Structural Attributes of Press Freedom:  Private Ownership, 
Public Orientation, and Editorial Independence, in JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER PRI-
VACY 17, 18 (Craig L. LaMay ed., 2003).  First, journalists exercise “editorial judgment” 
that is fundamentally different from how individuals form their beliefs and make ex-
pressive judgments.  Id.; see also Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial 
Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 757-58 (1999) (describing the body of case law related to 
claims of editorial freedom).  Second, the press comments on matters of public im-
port, while individuals’ speech “is, by its very nature, personal and therefore private.”  
Bezanson, The Structural Attributes of Press Freedom, supra, at 18-19.  In addition to the 
public/private distinction, Bezanson identifies what he takes to be the six other fun-
damental differences between individual and press speech.  Id. at 19-20. 
27 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 234 (D.D.C. 
2003) (noting that the prevailing thought is that “the Press Clause provides no greater 
rights [than the Speech Clause]”).  However, a handful of Justices have specifically ar-
gued that journalists deserve special privileges not enjoyed by the general public.  See, 
e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The 
concept of equal access must be accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate 
the practical distinctions between the press and the general public.”); Pell v. Procu-
nier, 417 U.S. 817, 841 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting the important func-
tional differences between access by the press and access by individuals, and arguing 
for special press accommodations); Saxbe v. Wash. Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the press’s function as a public watchdog should 
entitle it to interview prisoners under some circumstances, even when the general pub-
lic is not accorded such privileges); accord LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 
20 (1991) (arguing that the laws of “freedom of the press” and “freedom of speech” 
have been treated separately by several Justices since at least N.Y. Times v.  
Sullivan in 1964). 
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This group is split into two camps:  one relies on the Blackstonian view 
of the common law and original intent of the Framers to justify its po-
sition that “press” in the First Amendment simply means “written ex-
pression” and that the press is not afforded any special constitutional 
protection.28
The other camp walks a more delicate interpretive line:  it argues 
for press protections but not at the expense of added press responsi-
bilities.29  If the press receives special rights because it is a “public 
agent,” then the public can theoretically assert control over the 
press.30  And the most practicable means of the public asserting this 
control is through the government, which can more easily implement 
such mechanisms.31  Paradoxically, granting the press special rights 
under the First Amendment could actually lead to the press’s loss of 
independence from the government.32
Thomas Emerson and Laurence Tribe subscribe to the view that 
special press protections are tied to special press responsibilities.  Em-
erson argues that freedom of the press is just one component in the 
protection afforded by the First Amendment to “an integrated system 
of freedom of expression.”33  Tribe argues that the press as an institu-
tion does not need “extraordinary constitutional protection,” but that 
the interplay between the First and Fourth Amendments creates a 
unique situation that requires more sensitivity to journalists’ role in 
society.34  Tribe’s argument, though, rests on an ill-defined middle 
28 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 14, at 640 (suggesting that the Framers protected 
the press because of concerns that speech would be limited to oral expression). 
29 See WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 59-60 
(1984) (advocating First Amendment protections for the press, but disagreeing with 
the notion that these privileges are warranted because the press is an agent of the peo-
ple).  For specific opposition to this view, see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that a free press is necessary for a free 
society, but that society can mandate that the press act responsibly). 
30 See VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 29, at 59-60 (suggesting that if the press were an 
agent of the public, the public could dictate what is to be published). 
31 Cf. id. (noting that shortly after printing presses were invented, the English gov-
ernment, concerned about the hazards of the new technology, sharply regulated the 
press). 
32 See id. at 65 (explaining that by enjoying special privileges newspapers may lose 
editorial liberty); see also Anthony L. Fargo, The Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential 
Information in States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 241, 252 (2002) (“[T]he 
logical conclusion of providing the press with special First Amendment protections 
might be the death of [the press’s] independence from government interference.”). 
33 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court, in THE BURGER 
COURT:  THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 1, 3 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
34 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 976 (2d ed. 1988). 
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ground:  while the press should not have special protections, it should 
also not be regulated the same as an ordinary type of business.35
3.  Other Relevant Theories Supporting the Journalist’s Privilege 
One theory undergirding the journalist’s privilege is the “right to 
know.”36  Under this theory, the people have a right to know certain 
information, but because of the complexity of today’s society, and 
time and information constraints on individuals, citizens are unable to 
personally get the information they require.37  Enter the press, whose 
role is to provide individuals with such information.  In this respect, 
the press acts as an agent of the people.  This theory also implicates 
some of the problems associated with granting the press special rights:  
for example, if the press’s rights are derived from its service to the 
people, then the people (or their extension, the government) can ex-
ercise dominion over the press. 
Another theory supporting the journalist’s privilege is that the 
press’s role is to act as a check on government.38  Some variations of 
this theory argue that the press is a “watchdog,”39 keeping an eye on 
government, or that the press is a Fourth Estate,40 exercising its politi-
cal power for the good of the people.41  The press again acts as an 
35 See id. (“Legal procedures that threaten the confidentiality of reporters’ sources 
or disrupt the editorial process clearly implicate constitutional concerns not present 
when ordinary businesses are searched or most professionals questioned about their 
work . . . .”). 
36 The phrase “the right to know” was coined in a 1945 speech by journalist Kent 
Cooper.  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO KNOW 2 (1981). 
37 See Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1, 5-7 (arguing that the right to know protects the system of free expression from 
governmental interference and guarantees the availability of information from gov-
ernmental and certain private sources). 
38 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 537 (1977) (noting that Thomas Jefferson supported the “checking 
value” of freedom of the press). 
39 See, e.g., GLEASON, supra note 27, at 112 (suggesting that the press should enjoy 
special protection because of its role in conveying information to the public about the 
government and other public institutions). 
40 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION:  
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 260-62 (1991) (referring to the press as a “fourth 
estate” that oversees the government). 
41 See, e.g., JOHN LOFTON, THE PRESS AS GUARDIAN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xii 
(1980) (characterizing the press as “the vehicle and the symbol of unfettered expres-
sion” and postulating that the press, unlike other institutions, is willing to confront the 
government). 
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agent of the people, serving their will by monitoring the other three 
branches of government and keeping the people informed of any 
misdeeds. 
4.  The Marketplace of Ideas and Individual Liberty Paradigms  
The paramount concern for subscribers to the marketplace of 
ideas42 paradigm is that information reach the audience.  As Alexan-
der Meiklejohn phrased it, “What is essential is not that everyone shall 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”43  Conversely, 
under an individual liberty paradigm, the paramount concern is that 
individuals are able to express themselves.  According to Baker, the 
First Amendment is focused on the role of the speaker, not on the 
speaker’s impact on society.44
For those adhering to the marketplace of ideas interpretation of 
the First Amendment, a privilege for journalists makes intuitive sense 
because it encourages the dissemination of more information (and 
more valuable information) “so that everything worth saying shall be 
said.”  For adherents of the individual liberty interpretation of the 
First Amendment, however, a journalist’s privilege is not as indispen-
sable. 
A non-human entity such as a newspaper does not receive the 
same satisfaction from engaging in expression as a person does, and is 
42 The “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, with its philosophical roots in JOHN STU-
ART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), and JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), was first 
coined by Justice Holmes in the 1920s.  Fargo, supra note 13, at 89 n.137. 
43 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:  THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1965).  Meiklejohn argued that the societal interest in free speech 
outweighed the private interest in free speech.  ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 62 (1948).  He believed that the First 
Amendment’s language was absolute, and therefore that the societal interest in free 
speech could not be abridged.  Id.  For him, protection for the interests of private 
speech were adequately protected by the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 63. 
 For an elaboration of the impact of the Meiklejohn view on the courts and a dis-
cussion of the view that an absolute right to free speech allows the people to govern 
themselves, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1965). 
44 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 
964, 995-96 (1978) (maintaining that the right to free speech is valuable because it al-
lows individual self-fulfillment).  Though Baker views the Speech and Press Clauses as 
conceptually separate, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
229 (1989) [hereinafter BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY]; C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcast-
ing:  Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 62-64, his ex-
pressed views of the Speech Clause inform some of the paradigms of the First Amend-
ment expressed in this Part. 
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therefore not accorded the same First Amendment protections.  Nev-
ertheless, proponents of the individual liberty theory still argue for a 
privilege for journalists,45 mostly because a citizen cannot fully express 
herself without the greatest amount of information. 
5.  Conclusion  
Support for the journalist’s privilege is found in varying interpre-
tations of the First Amendment.  Each conceptualization of “freedom 
of the press” and the First Amendment implicates a different facet of 
the journalist’s privilege debate, and the theoretical arguments in fa-
vor of a journalist’s privilege necessarily depend on how one inter-
prets the meaning of “freedom of the press” in the First Amendment.  
It is not the place of this Comment to provide a comprehensive theory 
of the First Amendment; rather, each First Amendment theory pro-
vides a slightly different paradigm through which to view the journal-
ist’s privilege debate.  Nevertheless, each theory, in its own way, sup-
ports the privilege. 
B.  Testimonial Privileges 
Privileges are generally disfavored in our judicial system, but there 
is a recognition that some societal values sometimes outweigh the 
value in procuring evidence during trials.  These privileges typically 
protect a confidential communication between two parties, such as at-
torney-client, doctor-patient, or husband-wife, in which the need for 
open and frank discussion between the parties is so important that the 
judiciary does not compel their production at trials.46  The traditional 
four-part test for determining the validity of an asserted privilege was 
propounded by Professor John Henry Wigmore in 1904, and is often 
cited by courts today: 
45 See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY, supra note 44, at 245 (“Unless a member of the 
press appears to have engaged in criminal conduct—which may give her a fifth 
amendment privilege—she should not be required to answer questions about her in-
vestigations or her sources.”). 
46 The fundamental question in this area is whether there is a net benefit to soci-
ety.  Older notions (such as the idea that there is a special relationship between the 
attorney and the client that society values for some nonconsequentialist reason) have 
largely fallen by the wayside.  See, e.g., Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in 
a Utilitarian World, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1995) (analyzing the modern trend 
toward the use of utilitarian reasoning to justify privileges). 
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not 
be disclosed. 
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 
(3) The relation must be one that in the opinion of the community ought 
to be sedulously fostered. 
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure must be 
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litiga-
tion.
47
Wigmore’s criteria, which tend to support the traditional privi-
leges,48 do not lend themselves to the creation of a journalist’s privi-
lege.49  Over the past hundred years, however, Wigmore’s factors, 
while still relevant, have been superseded by a more expansive vision 
of evidentiary privileges.  The journalist’s privilege, while arguably 
unnecessary in 1904, fits nicely into the legal atmosphere of 2005. 
The journalist’s privilege is almost the inverse of the other privi-
leges that have long been protected at common law.  The traditional 
privileges protect the substance of the communication; the identity of the 
speaker is already known. The journalist’s privilege protects the source 
of the communication; the substance of the communication is already 
known.  In addition, the traditional privileges are pierced by disclos-
ing communication to a third party; the journalist’s privilege is prem-
ised on the idea that the communication already has been disclosed to 
numerous third parties.  Finally, with traditional privileges, the 
speaker holds the right to the privilege, and can waive that right.  
With the journalist’s privilege, the journalist (i.e., the recipient) is the 
47 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527. 
48 For an interesting argument on why communications to journalists are even 
more in need of protection than communications to doctors or lawyers, see Abraham 
S. Goldstein, Newsmen and Their Confidential Sources, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1970, 
at 13-15.  Goldstein argues that the person making the statement to a doctor or lawyer 
is doing so because of an urgent need for the professional’s help; for the client or pa-
tient, fear of disclosure at a later date is usually outweighed by the need for immediate 
assistance.  Id.  For the person communicating with the journalist, though, the reasons 
behind the communication are usually some combination of advancing the public 
good, the prospect of financial gain, or spite.  Id.  Therefore, this informant, who does 
not urgently need the journalist’s assistance, will be more likely than a person commu-
nicating with a doctor or lawyer to withhold information due to risk of future expo-
sure.  Id. 
49 The Supreme Court even cited Wigmore in rejecting the privilege in Branzburg. 
408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972).  See also VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 60 (“In applying 
Wigmore’s conditions, many courts deny reportorial privilege.”). 
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keeper of the privilege; the speaker cannot waive the privilege after 
the fact.50 
The reporter’s privilege, then, is most akin to the government-
informer privilege, which also protects the source of the communica-
tion rather than the communication itself.51  This privilege “recog-
50 See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES:  
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES RELATING TO WITNESSES & DOCUMENTS IN FEDERAL-LAW 
CASES 590 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that neither the news source nor the public has stand-
ing to assert or waive the privilege); see also 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5426, at 796 (1980) (“[I]t is rather 
unusual in the law of privileges to make the recipient rather than the communicator 
the holder of a privilege for confidential communications.”).  However, ownership of 
the privilege is not a settled legal matter.  See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Legal Analysts Critical 
of N.Y. Times Reporter’s Stance in Leak Probe, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005, at A7 (quoting 
First Amendment scholar Professor Geoffrey Stone that “[i]t’s the source’s privilege, 
not the reporter’s. . . . As a legal matter, it’s absurd [to argue otherwise]”). 
In fact, there is debate over how to determine if a source has voluntarily waived 
the privilege ex post, including whether that is possible, and if so, whether it is even 
relevant.  How could such a waiver be voluntary if it is mandated by one’s employer on 
the threat of dismissal for refusal to sign?  In the Judith Miller case, and in the Justice 
Department investigation into the source of the leaks during the anthrax investigation 
of scientist Stephen Hatfill, the federal government “asked” (the term is used loosely 
here) administration officials and Justice Department employees to sign waivers releas-
ing all journalists from pledges of confidentiality they might have made.  See Kurtz, su-
pra, at A7 (quoting First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams as saying that waivers in 
the form of “preprinted forms from the Department of Justice that people were in-
structed to sign by their superiors[] do not constitute the sort of waivers a journalist 
ought to accept as truly freeing the journalist from the obligation of confidentiality”); 
Carol D. Leonnig, 2 Reporters in Leak Case Given 48 Hours to Argue Against Jailing, WASH. 
POST, June 30, 2005, at A2 (quoting Chief Judge Hogan, who said that “[t]he sources 
have waived their confidentiality” and are therefore “not relying on the promises of the 
reporters”); Scott Shane, Anthrax Figure Wins a Round on News Sources, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2004, at A12 (noting that the Department of Justice asked employees to sign 
“Plame waivers” releasing journalists from their pledges of confidentiality, and recog-
nizing media experts’ worry that such waivers were becoming an “established legal 
tool”); see also Pete Yost, Reporter Won’t Talk, Goes to Jail, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 7, 2005, at 
4 (noting that Matt Cooper decided to provide testimony to the grand jury because his 
source gave him a “waiver” immediately before he was to be sentenced for contempt). 
51 See Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 255-56 (1973) (giving 
ownership of the privilege to the government, the recipient of the information, rather 
than the informant, the speaker of the information).  The irony here is that Wigmore 
was adamantly in favor of the government-informer privilege.  See Karl H. Schmid, 
Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Proceedings:  An Analysis of United States Court of 
Appeals’ and State High Courts’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, at 327 (2001) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (noting that Wigmore, while “vehemently op-
pos[ing] the journalist’s privilege . . . believed that the government-informer privilege 
was a sound principle of law” (citing WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 2192, at 
70-74)).  In addition, the Supreme Court has twice endorsed the idea of a government-
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nizes the use of informers as an important aspect of law enforcement” 
and concludes that the societal interest in law enforcement’s use of 
informers often outweighs the judicial interest in obtaining all rele-
vant evidence in a given case.52
The journalist’s privilege poses special theoretical and procedural 
issues for courts because it lacks the conceptual clarity and storied his-
tory of, say, the attorney-client privilege, and, in many ways, is the in-
verse of the traditional privilege relationship.  Unfortunately, courts 
often use these recurring issues as an excuse for denying the privilege 
when, in fact, the privilege would be robust if it were not viewed under 
the paradigm of Wigmore’s four criteria and the traditional notion of 
a testimonial privilege.  In short, society would be better served if 
courts looked at the privilege outside of the traditional Wigmorean 
scheme and were more understanding of the unique role that the 
journalist’s privilege plays in our democratic society. 
Wigmore, writing in 1904, may have had views of the press and 
press privileges that were not conducive to this privilege; moreover, 
courts, as discussed more fully in Part IV, have been loath to recognize 
privileges for additional professional groups. 53  But, as the robust sup-
port for the government-informer privilege demonstrates, the public 
interest in allowing certain confidences can be quite significant, and 
the procedural complaints that the privilege is too cumbersome to 
administer should not drown out the important role that a privilege 
for journalists will play in our society. 
C.  The Contours of the Journalist’s Privilege 
The term “journalist’s privilege,”54 as used in this Comment, refers 
generally to the right of journalists to refuse to answer subpoenas—a 
right the Supreme Court has never recognized.  However, the privi-
informer privilege.  See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). 
52 56 F.R.D. at 256. 
53 In addition, current privilege-holding professional groups also disfavor granting 
new privileges.  See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS:  ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND 
REVELATION 119 (1983) (“Every newly established professional group seeks the privi-
leges of existing ones.  Established ones, on the other hand, work to exclude those 
whom they take to be encroaching on their territory.”).  But see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 
supra note 50, § 5426, at 720-22 (arguing that “journalists are entitled to parity with 
other professional groups,” in part because reporters often hold the ethical canons of 
their profession in higher regard than court orders). 
54 The journalist’s privilege is also known as the “reporter’s privilege,” “reportorial 
privilege,” or “newsman’s privilege.” 
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lege comes in many forms:  it can be absolute or qualified, and can be 
applied differently depending on the subpoenaing party, type of case, 
and category of evidence.  In addition, there is an ongoing scholarly 
debate regarding the contours of the privilege and who should be 
able to claim it.55
At the outset, most jurisdictions do not allow journalists to assert 
the privilege for eyewitness accounts.56  So if a person—journalist, 
elected official, or ordinary citizen—witnesses a crime, she has a duty 
to provide testimony.57
An absolute privilege protects journalists from having to give any 
testimony or produce any documents.  A qualified privilege, on the 
other hand, allows the journalist to assert the privilege, but allows a 
judge to rule that the interests of the case at bar outweigh the journal-
ist’s interests.  There are two traditional tests to determine if a particu-
55 See Laurence B. Alexander, Broadening the Scope of the Newsgathering Privi-
lege to Protect Nontraditional Journalists:  A Definitional Dilemma 25 (Aug. 2000) 
(Research Paper, Law Division, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass 
Communication, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (“So daunt-
ing was the task of determining the sphere of protection that the Branzburg court gave 
it no attention.”).  Compare, e.g., id. at 27-28 (arguing for a totality of the circumstances 
approach to determine who is a journalist and is therefore accorded the journalist’s 
privilege, and cautioning against over-application of the privilege), with Julie Hilden, 
Can Bloggers Invoke the Journalist’s Privilege to Protect Confidential Sources Who Leak Trade 
Secrets?  A Suit Filed By Apple Computer Raises the Question, FINDLAW’S WRIT LEGAL COM-
MENTARY, Apr. 26, 2005, http://writ.findlaw.com/hilden/20050426.html (arguing for 
a much more expansive definition of “journalists” entitled to the privilege), and 
Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, But You Can’t Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at A39 
(“[T]he rules should be the same for old media and new, professional and amateur.  
Any journalist’s privilege should extend to every journalist.”). 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 360 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a 
journalist guilty of civil contempt for refusing to affirm or deny she had a conversation 
that was relevant to a criminal proceeding); United States v. Steelhammer, 561 F.2d 
539, 540 (4th Cir. 1977) (affirming a district court judgment of contempt for reporters 
who refused to testify about events they witnessed at a union rally).  But see Delaney v. 
Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 940 (Cal. 1990) (construing California’s shield law as 
protecting journalists from contempt citations for failure to provide eyewitness testi-
mony). 
57 Jeremy Bentham is often cited for the proposition that all persons have to sub-
mit to give testimony: 
Were the Prince of Wales, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Lord High 
Chancellor, to be passing by in the same coach, while a chimney-sweeper and 
a barrow-woman were in dispute about a halfpennyworth of apples, and the 
chimney-sweeper or the barrow-woman were to think proper to call upon 
them for their evidence, could they refuse it?  No, most certainly. 
4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-321 ( John Bowring ed., 1843); see also 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 n.26 (1972) (citing Bentham’s quip). 
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lar litigant can pierce the qualified privilege.  One is a three-part test 
derived from Justice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg.58  The other is a 
balancing test, in which the judge weighs the journalist’s interest in 
non-disclosure against society’s interest in disclosure.59
The type of proceeding often dictates a court’s determination of 
whether the privilege exists (and the contours of the privilege).  The 
Supreme Court clearly held in Branzburg60 that journalists have no 
privilege to refuse to answer grand jury subpoenas.  The law as to sub-
poenas made in the course of a criminal trial or civil trial, though, is 
indeterminate.  Some courts afford journalists less protection in 
criminal trials because of what the courts see as a stronger societal in-
terest in the outcome of the case than in civil trials, and also because 
the individual implications for the defendant (i.e., jail time) are ar-
guably more important.61  However, within criminal trials, some courts 
58 See infra text accompanying note 92 (outlining the test). 
59 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(advocating that courts, on a case-by-case basis, strike a “proper balance between free-
dom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with re-
spect to criminal conduct”); State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208, 213 (Idaho 1996) (estab-
lishing a balancing test for a qualified reporter’s privilege); Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 
S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
Of course, when presented as the journalist’s individual interest versus society’s 
interest, it is no surprise that society often wins.  One commentator argues, therefore, 
that the situation should be presented as societal interest versus societal interest (i.e., 
society’s interest in the free flow of information versus society’s interest in identifying 
the source of the information).  See Margaret Sherwood, Comment, The Newsman’s 
Privilege:  Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CAL. L. 
REV. 1198, 1219 (1970) (criticizing one court for labeling the “litigant’s right to com-
pelled testimony a ‘public’ interest and the newsman’s right to non-disclosure a ‘pri-
vate’ one”); see also VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that the privilege asserted 
by journalists is a public right, as opposed to the private right of privacy protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, which is at the heart of the privileges that protect communi-
cations with doctors, lawyers, and ministers).  Indeed, one can even conceive of the 
scales tipping further, such as society’s interest in the free flow of information versus 
an individual litigant’s desire for that information.  When the argument is formulated 
in this manner, the journalist should win.  Much therefore depends on whether the 
journalist is seen as representing a personal interest or societal interest. 
60 See infra Part II.A for a further discussion of the case. 
61 See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 
1988) (relying on the fact that the case was criminal in denying the journalist’s privi-
lege).  In addition, while the Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the right 
to compel evidence, there is no such analogous provision in the Seventh Amendment, 
which applies to civil trials.  Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall en-
joy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”), 
with U.S. CONST. amend. VII (failing to guarantee such a process for civil trials). 
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may be more deferential to prosecution rather than defense subpoe-
nas.62
The confidentiality of the materials sought often plays a large role 
in the amount of protection given by the courts.  The identity of the 
source of the information is usually confidential:  this is the traditional 
“anonymous source” that journalists strive so earnestly to protect.  
Tangible material that is meant to remain confidential (usually a 
document) often receives a slightly lesser degree of protection.  Fi-
nally, some courts afford less protection to non-confidential informa-
tion.63  This is information that journalists strive to protect because of 
the “integrity” of their profession and the supposed intrusion into 
their editorial process,64 rather than because they promised a source 
they would keep her identity a secret.  Nonconfidential information 
takes the form of television “outtakes,”65 photographs taken in public 
places, and journalists’ work product. 
Finally, any discussion of a potential journalist’s privilege must 
take into account the specific definition of a journalist.66  State laws 
providing a journalist’s privilege are not in agreement on the matter,67 
and different federal circuits have promulgated different tests to de-
termine if someone qualifies as a “journalist.”68  Some jurisdictions 
62 See Schmid, supra note 51, at 181-83 (showing empirically that federal appellate 
courts are significantly more favorable to prosecution and grand jury subpoenas than 
criminal defendant subpoenas). 
63 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1999) (afford-
ing less protection to nonconfidential materials than confidential materials).  The law 
in this area, as in most other areas dealing with journalist’s privilege, varies widely de-
pending on the particular federal circuit.  Compare United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 
963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998) (providing no protection for nonconfidential materials), with 
LaRouche, 841 F.2d at 1182 (giving the same amount of protection to both confidential 
and nonconfidential materials). 
64 Note, though, that the Supreme Court has held that the press has no right to 
shield its internal editorial processes.  See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) 
(refusing to “creat[e] a constitutional privilege [that] foreclose[s] direct inquiry into 
the editorial process”). 
65 An “outtake” is film that was taped with the intention of being aired, but that 
was cut out of the segment by editors.  See Alison Lynn Tuley, Note, Outtakes, Hidden 
Cameras, and the First Amendment:  A Reporter’s Privilege, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1817, 
1818 n.13 (1997) (defining an outtake as “unbroadcast videotaped material”). 
66 See supra notes 53-55 (staking out the varying positions in the debate over who is 
a “journalist” and should be accorded the privilege). 
67 See Laurence B. Alexander & Leah G. Cooper, Words That Shield:  A Textual 
Analysis of the Journalist’s Privilege, NEWSPAPER RES. J., Winter/Spring 1997, at 51, 55 
(1997) (noting the wide disparity in state shield laws’ definitions of “journalist”). 
68 See, e.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) (enumerating 
five principles used to determine whether a person is entitled to claim a journalist’s 
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only allow the institutional press to assert the privilege, while others 
allow independent “one-time” journalists to do so.69  Book authors are 
sometimes not accorded the privilege,70 nor sometimes are freelance, 
student, or non-profit journalists.  And with the advent of the Internet 
and blogs, the line between journalist and tech-savvy citizen is con-
tinually blurred.71
In spite of this definitional problem there is no debate that main-
stream, traditional newspaper and television reporters would qualify as 
journalists under a potential privilege. 
privilege).  The court emphasized that the test of whether someone was a journalist 
was whether, at the time she did the reporting or investigating, she had the intent to 
disseminate the information to the public.  Id. at 145; see also Kraig L. Baker, Com-
ment, Are Oliver Stone and Tom Clancy Journalists?  Determining Who Has Standing to Claim 
the Journalist’s Privilege, 69 WASH. L. REV. 739, 755 (1994) (advocating the adoption of 
the von Bulow test “to determine whether an individual or group has standing to claim 
the journalist’s privilege” because (1) “it is consistent with the goals and concerns that 
underlie the journalist’s privilege,” (2) it is flexible enough to “apply to new ways of 
communicating information,” and (3) deference should be given to the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, which have adopted the test, because they are experts in the area of 
media litigation). 
For some circuits, though, the von Bulow test is not sufficient.  See, e.g., In re Mark 
Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (requiring, in addition to an intent to dis-
seminate, “investigative reporting”). 
69 See Alexander & Cooper, supra note 67, at 56-57 (detailing the various defini-
tions of and protections for “journalists” under state law). 
70 See, e.g., REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY:  
A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED IN THE NEWS MEDIA IN 2001, at 3 
(2003), available at http://www.rcfp.org/agents/agents.pdf [hereinafter AGENTS OF 
DISCOVERY] (noting that a book author recently went to jail for refusing to disclose her 
confidential source). 
71 The famous quip by journalist A.J. Liebling is therefore losing its relevance.  A.J. 
Liebling, The Wayward Press:  Do You Belong in Journalism?, NEW YORKER, May 14, 1960, 
at 105, 109 (“Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one.”).  For a 
current story that melds journalist’s rights with new technology, see Jonathan Finer, 
Teen Web Editor Drives Apple to Court Action, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2005, at A1 (noting 
that the 19-year-old student operator of an Apple Computer-related technology website 
is asserting his First Amendment reportorial rights as a defense against Apple’s trade 
secret lawsuit against him); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Bear Flag League for Peti-
tioners in Part and Real Party in Interest in Part at 4, O’Grady v. Superior Court, No. 
H028579 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://socallawblog.com/wp-
content/BFLAmicusBrief.pdf (arguing in the Apple Computer case that Internet news 
sites and bloggers who qualify as “news gatherers” or “news reporters” should be 
treated as journalists and accorded a journalist’s privilege).  But see Hilden, supra note 
55 (arguing that the Bear Flag League made a “tactical mistake” in its amicus brief by 
drawing a line between bloggers who qualify as repeat news gatherers and those who 
do not; Hilden “would deem any blogger a journalist” and grant the privilege). 
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II. STATE OF THE LAW 
The seminal case in this area—Branzburg v. Hayes72—seemed to 
rule against a privilege for journalists, but it has left an unclear legacy, 
and its holding has been distinguished by courts of appeals and lim-
ited by state legislatures almost from the outset.  The evolution of the 
journalist’s privilege is thus an example of how an unclear Supreme 
Court precedent has fomented significant developments in the com-
mon law, culminating in a point where the common law now requires 
recognition of the privilege at the national level. 
A.  Federal Case Law 
In Branzburg, a five-member majority73 of the Court held that, ab-
sent two specific and infrequent circumstances,74 journalists have no 
federal right to refuse to provide testimony when subpoenaed by a 
grand jury.75  The case was a consolidation of four lower court cases 
(three state, one federal) involving three reporters, one each from 
Kentucky, California, and Massachusetts.76  The Court addressed the 
limited question of whether reporters have the same obligation as or-
dinary citizens to respond to grand jury subpoenas seeking informa-
72 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
73 Justice White wrote the opinion, and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.  Id. at 667. 
74 See id. at 707-08 (excepting inquiries not in good faith and those designed to 
“disrupt a reporter’s relationship with his news sources”). 
75 Id. at 708-09. 
76 Paul Branzburg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal in Kentucky who 
had written about illegal drug manufacturing and use and was subpoenaed by a state 
grand jury to testify about the information in his story.  The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals, the state’s high court at the time, ordered Branzburg to respond to the grand 
jury’s subpoena.  Branzburg v. Meigs, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1971); Branzburg v. Pound, 
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).  Earl Caldwell was a reporter for the New York Times who 
had written about the Black Panther Party in California.  A federal grand jury subpoe-
naed him for documents and testimony, and the Ninth Circuit upheld his refusal to 
appear or produce documents.  Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 
1970).  Paul Pappas was a television news reporter stationed in Providence, Rhode Is-
land, who had covered the Black Panthers in New Bedford, Massachusetts.  The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered him to respond to a grand jury subpoena 
seeking his testimony.  In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971). 
For the procedural history and detailed factual background of the cases, see 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667-679; VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 104-25.  For the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s legal analysis of the case, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 
964, 968-72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005).  For one reporter’s account 
of the ordeal, see Earl Caldwell, “Ask Me.  I Know.  I Was the Test Case,” SATURDAY REV., 
Aug. 5, 1972, at 4. 
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tion relevant to the commission of a crime.77  The Court answered the 
question in the affirmative, specifically declining to create a First 
Amendment-based testimonial privilege excusing reporters from giv-
ing testimony to grand juries.78  The Court based its decision on both 
the lack of concrete evidence that news flow would be inhibited with-
out a testimonial privilege79 and the lack of support for a journalist’s 
privilege in both the common law80 and Wigmore’s criteria.81  In addi-
tion, the Court noted the duty that journalists, like all citizens, have to 
give evidence, explicitly rejecting “the theory that it is better to write 
about crime than to do something about it.”82
While Justice Powell’s vote was necessary to garner a majority, his 
three-paragraph concurrence is widely seen as limiting the effect of 
77 408 U.S. at 682. 
78 Id. at 690-91. 
79 Id. at 693-94.  For a critique of the Court’s reliance on empirical evidence, see 
infra Part IV.B. 
80 See supra note 12 (explaining the Branzburg Court’s confusion of the constitu-
tional and common law bases for the privilege). 
81 Id. at 690 n.29; see also supra text accompanying note 47 (listing Wigmore’s crite-
ria). 
82 Id. at 692.  The Supreme Court implies that providing evidence against a crimi-
nal at trial is a better way to serve society than simply writing about the crime in a 
newspaper.  The Court missed the point, though, because for journalists, writing about 
crime is their way of “do[ing] something about it.”  See Fargo, supra note 13, at 548 
(criticizing the majority in Branzburg for “misinterpret[ing] the role of an independent 
press in a self-governing society”).  The press’s accomplishments in this role have 
proven very effective in the past for bringing about needed change.  See Elizabeth 
Zuckerman, Reporters Say There are Reasons for Shielding Sources, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 
2004, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/rhode_island/articles/2004/11/20/ 
reporters_say_there_are_reasons_for_shielding_sources/ (quoting David Kidwell, a 
Miami Herald reporter who went to jail for refusing to testify in Kidwell v. State, 730 So. 
2d 670 (Fla. 1998), as remarking:  “We don’t have badges and guns.  All we have is our 
word.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Sometimes, a journalist can do far more good by bringing an issue to the public’s 
attention than by testifying in a court proceeding.  For example, a confidential source 
provided a reporter in San Francisco with documents related to professional baseball 
players’ steroid use from a sealed grand jury proceeding.  By testifying as to the identity 
of the leak, the reporter would have helped solve a relatively minor courtroom proce-
dural infraction.  However, by writing about the scandal, the reporter fomented na-
tional media and public attention to the issue, extensive congressional hearings, and, 
most importantly, a reworking of Major League Baseball’s drug policy.  See generally T.J. 
Quinn, BALCO Out of Juice, DAILY NEWS (New York), July 17, 2005, at 60.  The public—
and democracy—is often best served when journalists publicize wrongdoing. 
For several contemporary examples of public wrongdoing that came to light only 
due to reporters’ pledges of confidentiality, see Comm. on Commc’ns & Media Law, 
Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, The Federal Common Law of Journalists’ Privilege:  
A Position Paper, 60 RECORD 214, 225-27 (2005), available at http://www.abcny.org/ 
Publications/record/vol.%2060%20no.%201.pdf. 
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the majority opinion.83  Indeed, Justice Powell’s concurrence is often 
thought to be a kind of dissent, leaving the majority as only a plural-
ity.84  Rejecting the majority’s view that no privilege exists, Justice Pow-
ell implicitly recognized such a privilege and advocated balancing 
“these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case ba-
sis.”85  Justice Powell ended his concurrence with a statement that 
seemingly contradicts the majority’s explicit holding:  “the courts will 
be available to newsmen under circumstances where legitimate First 
Amendment interests require protection.”86
Ironically, although the majority opinion seemed to be clear in 
holding that no journalist’s privilege exists, many lower courts that 
have tackled the issue have emphasized Justice Powell’s concurrence 
as the very reason for finding a journalist’s privilege in other circum-
stances.87  One commentator notes that Justice Powell, who had been 
on the bench only a few months, joined the majority opinion only be-
cause he was unsure of his proper role, and this inexperience on the 
High Court is what led to his “unorthodox concurring opinion.”88  
Another account notes that he joined the majority opinion only 
“[a]fter much hesitation,” and gives him much more credit for his ac-
tions, arguing that he was so cognizant of his role that he “used his 
crucial swing vote to limit the effect of [the] majority opinion.”89
83 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring) (“I add this brief statement to empha-
size what seems to me to be the limited nature of the Court’s holding.”). 
84 See, e.g., In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (wrongly labeling 
Branzburg a “plurality”).  Even one of the Justices involved in the case, Potter Stewart, 
did not see the case as a majority win.  See Stewart, supra note 22, at 635 (referring to 
the vote count in Branzburg, rather than five to four, as “four and a half to four and a 
half”). 
85 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
86 Id. 
87 See, e.g., Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(noting that several other circuits had based their support for a journalist’s privilege at 
least partially on Justice Powell’s concurrence); Fargo, supra note 13, at 430 (“[L]ower 
federal courts for the most part have interpreted Branzburg, because of Justice Powell’s 
concurrence, as endorsing a First Amendment privilege against disclosure of confiden-
tial information in at least some proceedings.”). 
88 STEPHEN BATES, THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE, THEN AND NOW 5-6 (2000). 
89 BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:  INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 223 (1979).  The notion that a Justice’s concurrence can narrow the Court’s 
holding is not unique.  See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 24-25, In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas to Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-3138) (quoting Justice 
Scalia for the proposition that a Justice who joins the majority in a 5-4 opinion, but 
writes a separate concurrence, can narrow the breadth of the majority’s holding (citing 
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 462 n.3 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
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Justice Stewart’s dissent90 argued for a qualified privilege for jour-
nalists.91  He argued that courts should employ a three-part test before 
ordering reporters to reveal confidences to a grand jury: 
[T]he government must (1) show that there is probable cause to believe 
that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific 
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought 
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First 
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding 
interest in the information.
92
Most lower courts that have recognized a journalist’s privilege have 
employed some variation of Justice Stewart’s three-part test.93
Finally, Justice Douglas’s dissent argued for an absolute privi-
lege.94  Douglas said that his view of the First Amendment was close to 
Meiklejohn’s,95 and that forcing a reporter to even appear before a 
grand jury would violate the precepts of the First Amendment.96
The outcome of Branzburg, then, was that a slim majority found no 
privilege, Justice Powell’s concurrence seemingly limited the major-
ity’s holding, three Justices advocated a qualified privilege, and one 
Justice advocated an absolute privilege. 
Fourteen years prior to Branzburg, then-Circuit Judge Stewart 
wrote the first federal court opinion that suggested recognition of a 
privilege for journalists based on the First Amendment.97  Garland v. 
Torre was a colorful dispute98 in which Judy Garland, in the course of 
her defamation suit against CBS, sought from reporter Marie Torre 
the identity of the source at CBS who allegedly made disparaging re-
marks about her.99  Judge Stewart, while recognizing that there could 
be cases in which a First Amendment-based privilege would protect 
90 Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.  Branzburg,  408 
U.S. at 665. 
91 Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
93 See James C. Goodale et al., Reporter’s Privilege, in 3 COMMUNICATIONS LAW 404-06 
& n.85 (PLI Commc’ns Law, Course Handbook Series 2004) (listing cases). 
94 408 U.S. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at 713-14.  See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of the Meiklejohn view of the 
First Amendment. 
96 408 U.S. at 712. 
97 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).  In fact, Justice Stewart first sug-
gested his three-part test in this case.  Id. at 549-50. 
98 For a first-person account of the ordeal (and its positive effect on the author’s 
career as a journalist), see MARIE TORRE, DON’T QUOTE ME (1965). 
99 259 F.2d at 547. 
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reporters,100 nevertheless held that the interests of the plaintiff in this 
case required disclosure.101
Today, the level of protection for journalists varies widely across 
the circuit courts of appeals,102 from a high level of protection in the 
Second and Ninth Circuits to no protection at all in the Sixth Circuit.  
The D.C.,103 First,104 Second,105 Third,106 Fourth,107 Fifth,108 Ninth,109 
Tenth,110 and Eleventh111 Circuits have all explicitly recognized the 
privilege.  The Seventh Circuit has not ruled explicitly one way or the 
other, but has recently cast doubt on the existence of a federal jour-
nalist’s privilege.112  The Eighth Circuit has not made a definitive rul-
100 Id. at 548. 
101 Id. at 551. 
102 See generally Goodale et al., supra note 93, at 431-573 (2004) (outlining in detail 
the case law in each circuit); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, The Re-
porter’s Privilege, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (provid-
ing a comprehensive legal database for the specifics of the law of journalist’s privilege 
in each circuit). 
103 See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[A] qualified privilege 
would be available in some circumstances even where a reporter is called before a 
grand jury to testify.”). 
104 See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594 (1st Cir. 
1980) (finding support for a journalist’s privilege from, inter alia, Branzburg, Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979), FED. R. CIV. P. 26, and FED. R. EVID. 501). 
105 See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that Sec-
ond Circuit law protects the interests of both reporters and the public in safeguarding 
journalists’ sources, implementing Justice Stewart’s three-part test for determination of 
the qualified journalist’s privilege, and finding “no legally-principled reason for draw-
ing a distinction between civil and criminal cases”). 
106 See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(“[ J]ournalists have a federal common-law qualified privilege arising under Fed. R. 
Evid. 501 to refuse to divulge their confidential sources.”). 
107 See Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (“News reporters 
are entitled to some constitutional protection of the confidentiality of [their] sources.” 
(citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974))). 
108 See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We 
hold that a reporter has a First Amendment privilege which protects the refusal to dis-
close the identity of confidential informants, however, the privilege is not abso-
lute . . . .”). 
109 See Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen facts acquired 
by a journalist in the course of gathering the news become the target of discovery, a 
qualified privilege against compelled disclosure comes into play.”). 
110 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he 
[ journalist’s] privilege is no longer in doubt.”). 
111 See United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (adopting 
Justice Stewart’s three-part test for a qualified journalist’s privilege). 
112 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that courts 
recognizing a privilege for nonconfidential information “may be skating on thin ice”). 
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ing,113 but district courts in the circuit have recognized the privilege.114  
Only the Sixth Circuit has explicitly denied the privilege’s existence115 
(and even district courts in the Sixth Circuit have acknowledged the 
privilege.)116
B.  States’ Actions 
The Supreme Court in Branzburg invited state legislatures to enact 
their own journalist’s privilege laws.117  At the time of the decision, 
seventeen states had already done so;118 today, thirty-two states119 have 
shield laws.120  California has even added protection for journalists to 
113 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 n.8 (8th Cir. 
1997) (noting that the question of a “qualified news reporter’s privilege . . . is an open 
one in this Circuit”). 
114 See, e.g., Richardson v. Sugg, 220 F.R.D. 343, 347 (E.D. Ark. 2004) (“[There is] a 
First Amendment qualified reporter’s privilege in civil cases against compelled disclo-
sure of the identity of the reporter’s confidential sources and of information, both 
confidential and nonconfidential, gathered by the reporter in the news gathering 
process.”). 
115 See Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e 
decline to join some other circuit courts . . . [that have] adopted the qualified privilege 
balancing process urged by the three Branzburg dissenters and rejected by the major-
ity.”).  The court disagreed with (and openly criticized) the other circuits’ reading of  
Justice Powell’s concurrence as limiting the majority opinion, and Justice Stewart’s dis-
sent as supplying a three-part balancing test.  Id.  “The Constitution does not, as it 
never has, exempt the newsman from performing the citizen’s normal duty of appear-
ing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury’s task.”  Id. at 583 (quoting 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691). 
116 See, e.g., Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (W.D. Mich. 
1996) (finding a qualified reporter’s privilege). 
117 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (stating the Court’s desire to leave “state legisla-
tures free . . . to fashion their own standards”). 
118 See id. at 690 n.27 (listing the states that had enacted a journalist’s privilege 
law). 
119 References herein to “states” will include the District of Columbia (which has a 
shield law). 
120 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.300-.390 (2004); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (1987); CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1986.1 (West 1998); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1999); 
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4701 to -4704 (LexisNexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 
(West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995 & Supp. 2005); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/8-901 to -909 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-1 (West 1999); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1459 (1999); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 767.5a (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West 2000); MONT. 
CODE ANN. §§ 21-1-901 to -903 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1997); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.275, 49.385 (LexisNexis 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 
(West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §38-6-7 (LexisNexis 1998); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h 
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its constitution.121  In addition, two state supreme courts have created 
such privileges, based on their interpretations of the evolving com-
mon law.122  Courts in every other remaining state123 (save 
Wyoming124) have recognized some form of the privilege. 
(McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.11 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (LexisNexis 2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
12, § 2506 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 
(2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (2004); 
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000).  Guam has also enacted a shield law.  GUAM 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9101 (1993). 
121 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(b). 
122 See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373, 375-77 (Mass. 
1991) (recognizing a journalist’s privilege, grounded in the common law, for criminal 
grand juries); Sinnott v. Boston Ret. Bd., 524 N.E.2d 100, 103-04 (Mass. 1988) (recog-
nizing a journalist’s privilege, grounded in the common law, for civil actions); Senear 
v. Daily Journal-Am., 641 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Wash. 1982) (finding a rebuttable common 
law privilege). 
123 The following cases, drawn from state appellate courts, have recognized the 
privilege:  Conn. State Bd. of Labor Relations v. Fagin, 370 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1976) (“[T]he public interest in non-disclosure of a journalist’s confidential 
sources [sometimes] outweighs the public and private interest in compelled testi-
mony.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 
783 (2d Cir. 1972)); State v. Salsbury, 924 P.2d 208, 213 (Idaho 1996) (establishing a 
balancing test for a qualified reporter’s privilege); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 
847, 850 (Iowa 1977) (“[T]his court is persuaded there exists a [limited] fundamental 
newsperson privilege . . . .”); State v. Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (Kan. 1978) (“[A] 
newsperson has a limited privilege of confidentiality . . . .”); In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 
722, 726 (Me. 1990) (requiring a “balance between societal and constitutional inter-
ests”); Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (adopting a bal-
ancing test for journalist’s privilege); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644, 647 (N.H. 
1977) (finding a qualified privilege based on the state constitution); Hopewell v. Mid-
continent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 782 (S.D. 1995) (“[W]e hold that a ‘qualified 
privilege’ protects confidential news sources from disclosure under certain circum-
stances.”); Channel Two Television v. Dickerson, 725 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. App. 
1987) (recognizing a qualified reporter’s privilege); State v. Gundlah, 624 A.2d 368, 
369 (Vt. 1993) (holding that a reporter had a “colorable constitutional claim” to a 
journalist’s privilege, even though the case was moot); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 
S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974) (finding a privilege related to the First Amendment); State 
ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass’n v. Ranson, 488 S.E.2d 5, 10 (W. Va. 1997) (“[A] reportorial 
privilege exists in West Virginia.”); Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Wis. 1978) 
(“[A] journalist ha[s] a constitutionally based privilege to refuse to disclose sources of 
information received in confidence . . . .” (citing State v. Knops, 183 N.W.2d 93, 99 
(Wis. 1970))). 
Appellate courts in Hawaii, Mississippi, and Utah have not been presented with 
the issue since Branzburg, but federal district courts in these states, relying on their in-
terpretation of each state’s law, have found the privilege.  See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 
507 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D. Haw. 1981) (“First Amendment protection of a free press 
underlies the newsman’s privilege to refuse to reveal news sources under certain cir-
cumstances . . . .”); Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240, 242 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (assum-
ing Mississippi courts would employ Justice Stewart’s three-part test); Bottomly v. Leu-
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The scope of protection afforded by state shield law varies widely 
among the states.125  Indeed, one analysis of each state’s shield law 
found the differences to be enormous, ranging from protecting all in-
formation (including eyewitness accounts and non-confidential in-
formation) to protecting identities of sources only, from protecting all 
proceedings to protecting only adjudicative court proceedings, from 
granting an absolute privilege to granting a qualified privilege, and 
finally requiring widely varying levels of proof from a party seeking the 
information.126
C.  Foreign Jurisdictions’ Treatment 
Several foreign common law jurisdictions have also recognized a 
privilege for journalists.127  While the United States is certainly not 
bound by such decisions, foreign courts’ decisions do carry persuasive 
weight when their reasoning is sound.128
cadia Nat’l Corp., 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2118, 2119-20 (D. Utah 1996) (using a bal-
ancing test for a qualified journalist’s privilege). 
124 Wyoming courts, state and federal, as far my research has shown, have never 
been presented with the issue. 
125 See Alexander & Cooper, supra note 67, at 55 (“There was no language [in 
shield laws] that was common across the states.”). 
126 Id. at 61-64, tbls.1,  2 ,  3 ,  & 4 . 
127 For an overview of several countries’ approaches to privileges for journalists, 
see INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, THE ARTICLE 19 FREEDOM OF EX-
PRESSION HANDBOOK:  INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, STANDARDS AND PRO-
CEDURES (1993). 
128 For recent examples of the Supreme Court looking abroad for guidance, see 
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005) (“It is proper that we acknowledge the 
overwhelming weight of international opinion . . . .”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
573 (2003) (looking to the European Court of Human Rights and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights for guidance); see also Charles Lane, The Court is Open for 
Discussion:  AU Students Get Rare Look at Justices’ Legal Sparring, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 
2005, at A1 (attributing to Justice Breyer the “idea that the Supreme Court needs to 
take greater notice of the legal opinions abroad”).  However, not all members of the 
Court are in favor of using foreign courts’ rationales in deciding U.S. cases.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these for-
eign views . . .  [is] meaningless dicta.”); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 n.* (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court[] . . . should not im-
pose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”); see also Lane, supra, at A1 (at-
tributing to Justice Scalia the idea that “the framers of the U.S. Constitution ‘would be 
appalled’ to see the document they wrote interpreted in light of the views of European 
courts”).  For a fine discussion of the current effect of foreign judgments on American 
jurisprudence, see Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43 (2004). 
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The European Court of Human Rights has held that journalists 
have a privilege to refuse to disclose their confidential sources.129  To 
overcome the privilege, the government must show “an overriding re-
quirement in the public interest.”130  This can be accomplished only 
by proving (1) “‘necessity’ for any restriction on freedom of expres-
sion,” and (2) proportionality “to the legitimate aim pursued.”131  Af-
ter noting that “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of democratic society,” the court held that journalists’ 
“watchdog” function would be seriously undermined if they were 
compelled to disclose information given them in confidence.132  The 
court was particularly concerned with the “chilling effect” of requiring 
journalists to disclose their confidential sources.133
The New Zealand Court of Appeal similarly held that under the 
common law “newspaper rule,” the press (both print and broadcast) is 
protected from disclosing the source of confidential information.134  
Noting the “public interest in the dissemination of information,” the 
court held that the rule applies pretrial as well as at trial, and in ac-
tions for libel as well as actions in which the reporter is not a party.135  
The court set a very high threshold for piercing the privilege:  “The 
rule is one to be applied by the Courts as a matter of course except 
where special circumstances are established warranting a departure 
from it.”136  As support for its holding that a democratic society de-
mands high protection for the press, the court cited several English, 
Australian, and New Zealand cases sustaining the theory underlying 
the “newspaper rule”:  that the public interest in a free press demands 
that journalists be given a privilege to refuse to identify the sources of 
confidential information.137
In Canada, Ontario’s highest court established a journalist’s privi-
lege in 2004.138  The court noted that the “law of privilege may evolve 
129 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500 (citing 
the role of an independent press as a governmental watchdog, inter alia, as grounds 
for finding a rebuttable journalist’s privilege). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Broad. Corp. of N.Z. v. Alex Harvey Indus., Ltd., [1980] 1 N.Z.L.R. 163 (C.A.), 
163. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 170-71. 
138 R. v. Nat’l Post, 69 O.R.3d 427, ¶ 82 (Ontario 2004) (Can.). 
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to reflect the social and legal realities of our time.”139  Interestingly, 
though most commentators cite Wigmore for the proposition that 
journalists should not be afforded a privilege,140 the Ontario court 
used Wigmore’s four criteria to find “an overwhelming interest in pro-
tecting the identity” of confidential sources.141  The court outlined a 
balancing test for lower courts to use when determining when the in-
terests of society are best served by compelling testimony from report-
ers.142
Decisions from Canada and New Zealand, jurisdictions both based 
on the same English common law as the United States, should carry 
persuasive weight with our courts,143 especially considering that the 
United States holds itself up as a world leader in terms of protecting 
press freedoms.144  Similarly, American courts should take note that 
Article Ten of the European Convention on Human Rights,145 which 
protects “freedom of expression” (similar to the U.S. Constitution’s 
First Amendment), was interpreted by Europe’s high court as granting 
a privilege to journalists.146
139 Id. ¶ 58 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
140 See supra Part I.B (noting Wigmore’s opposition to the journalist’s privilege). 
141 Nat’l Post, 69 O.R.3d, ¶ 78. 
142 Id. ¶ 82. 
143 See supra note 128 for a discussion of international law’s impact on American 
law. 
144 See Kim R. Holmes, Assistant Sec’y for Bureau of Int’l Org. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Remarks to the World Press Freedom Committee and Communications Media 
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York ( June 27, 2003), 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2003/22115.htm (contrasting the 
United States’ open stance toward the press with other countries’ “repressi[ve]” 
stances by stating “the U.S. Government . . . is committed to strengthening the role of 
free media in society.  Press freedom and access to information is so vitally important 
to developing democracies”); Stephan Minikes, U.S. Permanent Rep., Org. for Sec. 
and Cooperation in Europe, Statement to the Permanent Council ( July 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2005_07/alia/a5071809.htm (“The United 
States has the strongest freedom of expression protections in the world. . . . Freedom 
of the press . . . is protected under U.S. law to a significantly greater degree than is 
provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”). 
145 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
art. 10, ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of ex-
pression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers.”). 
146 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 502 (hold-
ing that ordering the disclosure of a journalist’s sources would be incompatible with 
Article 10 absent a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate 
aim pursued by the disclosure order and the means deployed to achieve that aim”). 
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D.  Other Sources of the Privilege 
In addition to federal courts, state courts, and state legislatures, 
there are several other sources that affect the law of journalist’s privi-
lege. 
First, Congress has repeatedly considered enacting a federal shield 
law,147 and held numerous hearings on the issue in the early 1970s in 
the wake of Branzburg.148  Though none of these bills has been success-
ful,149 their existence and support from several legislators is telling.150  
147 The first such bill was introduced by Senator Arthur Capper in 1929.  CHARLES 
W. WHALEN, JR., YOUR RIGHT TO KNOW 175 (1973).  The most recent bills were intro-
duced by Sen. Richard Lugar in the Senate and Rep. Michael Pence in the House, 
both on July 18, 2005.  See Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 1419, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (seeking to “maintain the free flow of information to the public by providing 
conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons 
connected with the news media”); Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, H.R. 3323, 
109th Cong. (2005) (setting forth the same mission).  These bills joined a Senate bill 
currently pending that was introduced by Sen. Christopher Dodd, Free Speech Protec-
tion Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005), a Senate bill currently pending with four 
bipartisan co-sponsors, Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 340, 109th Cong. 
(2005), and a House bill with nine bipartisan co-sponsors, Free Flow of Information 
Act of 2005, H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005).  Indeed, immediately following Branzburg, 
no fewer than forty-six separate bills relating to a journalist’s privilege were introduced 
in Congress.  VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 155 n.46. 
148 See, e.g., Hearings on Newsmen’s Privilege Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 383 (1973) (statement of Benno Schmidt, Jr., 
Professor of Law, Columbia Univ. Law Sch.) (addressing the government’s ability to 
establish a journalist’s privilege); Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 92d Cong. 146 (1972) (testimony of Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr.) (evaluating 
the relationship between the press and the government); Hearings on Freedom of the Press 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong. 18-23 
(1971-1972) (testimony of Harding F. Bancroft, Executive Vice President, N.Y. Times) 
(analyzing the ability and need for the government to establish the journalist’s privi-
lege).  One congressional committee even produced a lengthy report on the issue.  See 
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., THE NEWSMAN’S PRIVILEGE 1 (Comm. Print 1966) 
(explaining past efforts at establishing a journalist’s privilege). 
In addition, two congressmen have chronicled their experiences in trying to pass 
a journalist’s privilege bill through his respective chamber.  See WHALEN, supra note 
147, at 175 (Rep. Whalen) (detailing congressional attempts to establish a journalist’s 
privilege); Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 233-
41 (1974) (Sen. Ervin) (tracing the history of the press privilege issue from 1722 to the 
author’s attempts to pass press privilege legislation in the 1970s). 
149 The current bills pending before Congress, though enjoying bipartisan sup-
port, are likely doomed to the same fate, mostly because they are opposed by the Jus-
tice Department and the Bush Administration and their enactment will not win mem-
bers of Congress any political points.  See Lorne Manly, Bill to Shield Journalists Gets 
Senate Panel Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at A13 (noting that a scholar on con-
gressional voting “did not sense deep support” for the bill).  For an interesting first-
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A federal shield law has the benefit of adding a degree of certainty to 
the process,151 and is favored by some commentators who believe that 
judges are too self-interested in opposing the privilege to see its larger 
benefit to society.152
Aside from the issues associated with a state shield law,153 a federal 
shield law has the added complication of its interaction with state laws.  
While state shield laws sometimes apply in federal court154 (in diversity 
suits and in suits based on supplemental jurisdiction),155 there is de-
person account of the dénouement of federal action on the issue in 1973, see Ervin, 
supra note 148, at 270-75. 
150 However, some commentators argue that if Congress has considered and re-
jected the idea of passing a particular piece of legislation, courts should infer that 
Congress decided that the legislation was undesirable.  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, 
Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid:  Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional 
Silence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 529-30 (1982) (attributing at least some meaning to Congress’s 
inaction on a particular issue).  However, there are several reasons that Congress 
might stop consideration of a bill—legislative inertia being the most apparent—that do 
not evidence Congress’s particular intent.  See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREA-
TION OF PUBLIC POLICY 766, 772 (1988) (identifying the causes of congressional inac-
tion); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Patterson v. McLean:  Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67, 69 (1988) (identifying three situations where congressional inaction 
can be interpreted as meaningful). 
151 See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the need for certainty in the area of jour-
nalist’s privilege. 
152 See VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 145 (noting that judges often act to preserve 
their own myopic interest of orderly courtroom management).  But cf. Lewis H. Lap-
ham, The Temptations of a Sacred Cow, HARPER’S, Aug. 1973, at 43, 43 (remarking that 
having congressmen craft the dimensions of a journalist’s privilege is akin to having 
“convicts building gallows from which they will hang,” and, thus, Congress will fare no 
better at constructing the privilege). 
153 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of state shield laws. 
154 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (“[I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an 
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the 
privilege of a witness . . . shall be determined in accordance with State law.”).  The 
process is reciprocal:  federal courts do not apply state shield laws if the case is predi-
cated on a federal question.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 564 
(9th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal privilege law, not state law, must be applied in criminal 
cases brought in federal court.”); In re Am. Broad. Cos., 947 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 (E.D. 
Ark. 1996) (denying the news media organization’s state shield law-based claim of a 
journalist’s privilege “since state law privileges do not apply to a federal grand jury 
subpoena”). 
For a novel argument that Congress should incorporate state law privileges into 
federal cases, see Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and 
Federal Criminal Proceedings:  The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 447 (2002) 
(“Congress should provide an exception to Rule 501 that would allow a reporter’s 
privilege in the forum state to apply in federal grand jury proceedings and criminal 
cases, just as it would in civil diversity cases.”). 
155 For rules on when a suit is subject to diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, see 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (2000). 
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bate over whether the federal government has the power to force a 
federal shield law on state courts,156 or whether the federal govern-
ment should even try to do so.  However, if federal law did not pre-
empt the states’ laws, then the benefits of uniformity would not be re-
alized. 
Congress has passed one law that touches on the issue of the jour-
nalist’s privilege, evidencing at least its support for the cause.  In the 
Privacy Protection Act of 1980,157 which was passed in response to the 
Court’s decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,158 Congress protected 
news organizations’ places of business from search warrants.159  How-
ever, while preventing law enforcement from casually searching a 
newsroom, the law has no bearing on the organization’s duty to pro-
vide the evidence as a result of a subpoena. 
The most influential federal source on the subject is the Attorney 
General’s Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media,160 promul-
gated by Attorney General John Mitchell in 1970 in response to press 
uproar surrounding callous prosecutorial subpoenas.161  The Guide-
lines require the Attorney General to personally sign off on any sub-
poena to the press and note the Justice Department’s policy of only 
156 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 825, 875 (2005) (noting the unsettled question of “whether congres-
sional delegations of legislative power to state courts”—i.e., asking state courts to in-
terpret and make federal common law with respect to privileges—“would be unconsti-
tutional acts of commandeering state institutions or unconstitutional delegations of 
federal legislative power to state institutions”); Mark Neubauer, Comment, The News-
man’s Privilege After Branzburg:  The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 UCLA L. REV. 160, 
187-88 (1976) (arguing that a federal shield law that forces federal evidentiary rules on 
state courts would have to be implemented under either Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce or its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
157 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000). 
158 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (holding that police can execute a search warrant on a 
news outlet consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments). 
159 See 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 25:32, 
at 52 n.2 (2005) (noting that the Act limits the situations in which government officers 
may search for journalists’ “work products” or “documentary materials”). 
160 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004). 
161 For an account of Attorney General Mitchell’s reasoning behind the Guide-
lines, see John Mitchell, Free Press and Fair Trial:  The Subpoena Controversy, 59 ILL. B.J. 
282, 283 (1970) (attempting to balance “the two great rights in conflict”:  the guaran-
tee of freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial).   
The Attorney General’s Guidelines were not well received by commentators at the 
time, who accused the Department of Justice of trying to shield itself from criticism.  
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 739-40.  One congressman even called 
them “laughable.”  Id. at 740 (citing Newsman’s Privilege Act:  Hearing on H.R. 837 Before 
Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 152 (1972)). 
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issuing subpoenas when all other means of acquiring the information 
have failed.162  Note, though, that the Guidelines have no bearing on 
the actions of state prosecutors.  The Supreme Court expressed its 
hope in Branzburg that the Guidelines “may prove wholly sufficient to 
resolve the bulk of disagreements and controversies between press 
and federal officials,”163 but, as this Comment demonstrates, the prob-
lems between the press and government have only worsened,164 and 
the Guidelines have not stopped the proliferation of subpoenas.165  
And, despite the Guidelines, the Justice Department does not support 
protections for journalists.166
 Finally, opponents of the journalist’s privilege argue that the fed-
eral rules of procedure provide adequate protection for journalists in 
complying with subpoenas.  The rules allow courts to quash subpoe-
nas in criminal trials if “compliance would be unreasonable or oppres-
sive,”167 and in civil trials if they constitute “annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”168  However, these 
rules were not crafted with the press in mind, and special accommo-
dations must be made in order to respond to journalists’ unique cir-
cumstances.  This is not unlike Emerson’s and Tribe’s views that while 
the press should not get special protections, courts must still be cogni-
zant of the press’s unique role (and responsibilities and limitations).169
162 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2004).  For a critique of the Guidelines, see VAN GERPEN, su-
pra note 6, at 72-73 (questioning the effectiveness of administrative guidelines, which 
can be altered “by the stroke of a pen”); see also BATES, supra note 7, at 4 (noting pes-
simistically that journalists’ protection under the Guidelines “depend[s] on who holds 
office as Attorney General”). 
163 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). 
164 See infra Part III.C (discussing how the relationship between the media and the 
government has become more adversarial than in the past). 
165 See infra Part III.A.1 (noting that subpoenas to the press are more prevalent to-
day than they were at the time that Branzburg was decided). 
166 See Reporters’ Privilege Legislation:  Issues and Implications:  Hearing on S. 340 and 
H.R. 581 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. ( July 20, 2005) (statement of 
James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen.), available at http://www.cjog.net/documents/ 
James_Comey_testimony.pdf (calling a bill proposing a federal shield law “bad public 
policy” and noting the Justice Department’s opposition to such privileges for journal-
ists). 
167 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 33-35 (describing Emerson’s and Tribe’s 
views on freedom of the press). 
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III.  THE NEED FOR A JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
The nation’s journalists today need a privilege more than they did 
thirty years ago and more than they did at the nation’s founding.  
First, the number of subpoenas to news organizations is markedly in-
creasing,170 underscoring the need for judicial imposition of restraint 
on prosecutors.  Second, due to uncertainties in the law and the fo-
rum in which litigation might arise,171 reporters and sources are hard-
pressed to discern the strength of any promise of confidentiality.  In 
addition, news organizations are increasingly becoming national in 
scale, leading to the growing hardship placed on reporters and editors 
(not to mention informants) of having to know the scope of any 
shield law or common law privilege in a particular state or circuit at a 
particular time.  A pronouncement by the Supreme Court recognizing 
a uniform journalist’s privilege will help alleviate this strain.  Third, 
the media’s relationship with the government has grown more adver-
sarial, requiring the courts to place a check on the executive branch.  
Finally, courts are finding alarming numbers of journalists in con-
tempt and ordering them to pay fines and even serve jail time,172 high-
lighting the need for judicial restraint in dealing with journalist’s 
privilege cases. 
A.  Subpoenas 
1.  The Prevalence of Subpoenas to the Press 
Subpoenas are more prevalent today than they were at the time 
Branzburg was decided.173  There are three interrelated reasons behind 
this phenomenon. 
170 See sources cited infra note 173 (showing the rise in press subpoenas). 
171 See Jane E. Kirtley, Branzburg v. Hayes Still Casts Uncertainty on Journalists’ First 
Amendment Rights, BULLETIN (Silha Ctr., Univ. of Minn., Minneapolis, Minn.), Summer 
2004, at 1, 1, http://www.silha.umn.edu/Summer04/branzburg_v_hayes.pdf (“The 
result [of Branzburg] has been a crazy quilt of rulings which are often inconsistent and 
irreconcilable.”). 
172 See infra note 216 (detailing the cases of reporters who have recently been jailed 
for contempt). 
173 Compare Achal Mehra, Newsmen’s Privilege:  An Empirical Study, 59 JOURN. Q. 560, 
561 (1982) (finding that between 1960 and 1968 fewer than two subpoenas per year 
were served on reporters and that in 1982 the number was estimated to be at least 
150), with AGENTS OF DISCOVERY, supra note 70, at 4 (finding that 823 subpoenas were 
served on the media in 2001).  Statistically, both sources under-represent the actual 
number of subpoenas.  Mehra relies on reported cases (and therefore cannot account 
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First, prosecutors have become reluctant to perform their own in-
vestigations (whether because of the time, money, or effort involved), 
and have taken note that it is cheaper and sometimes just as effective 
to rely on the media for evidence.174  When prosecutors think they 
have a green light to use journalists’ information, they do not hesitate 
to issue subpoenas.175  Journalists also receive more subpoenas than 
the average citizen because they are significantly better witnesses.176  
Thirty-five years ago, the editors of the Columbia Journalism Review 
rhetorically questioned “whether American law enforcement agen-
cies . . . have reached such a low state of efficiency that they cannot 
maintain their own surveillance of potentially dangerous organiza-
tions.”177  That statement rings even more true today. 
Second, video makes for exemplary courtroom evidence.  Before 
television became as widespread as it is today, prosecutors who wanted 
to subpoena news outlets had to rely on reporters’ first-person (and 
often second-person) accounts.  Film can capture an event and freeze 
for unreported cases), and Agents of Discovery uses a survey (and therefore cannot ac-
count for non-responsive survey recipients).  But cf. Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1201-
03 (attributing at least a partial rise in the number of subpoenas to the simple fact that 
the press and the government have assumed more antagonistic roles toward each 
other, so that while previously an informal request was met with an informal produc-
tion of evidence, now a formal subpoena is needed). 
174 See Laurence B. Alexander et al., Branzburg v. Hayes Revisited:  A Survey of Jour-
nalists Who Become Subpoena Targets, NEWSPAPER RES. J., Spring 1994, at 83, 95-97 (show-
ing empirically that without the intervention of the courts (or legislature), prosecutors 
are more brazen about subpoenaing journalists for information); see also SMOLLA, supra 
note 159, § 25:34, at 54 (“[A]t some point in the future, the government may abandon 
its tendency to tread lightly with requests for material from the media, and may begin 
to push aggressively for information.”).  But see Thomas C. Desmond, The Newsmen’s 
Privilege Bill, 13 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8 (1949) (deeming claims by law enforcement officials 
that a reporter’s privilege would interfere with criminal investigations as “groundless” 
because “surely the law enforcement officials, aided by staffs of trained technicians and 
armed with the latest weapons of science are in a better position to find a criminal 
than is a reporter”). 
175 See Alexander et al., supra note 174, at 95-96 (finding that the number of prose-
cution subpoenas to the press markedly increased in the two years immediately follow-
ing the Florida Supreme Court’s limiting of the scope of the journalist’s privilege in 
the state); Emerson, supra note 33, at 17 (“Following Branzburg the number of in-
stances in which reporters were called upon to produce materials obtained in confi-
dence greatly increased.”). 
176 See Timothy L. Alger, Comment, Promises Not to Be Kept:  The Illusory Newsgath-
erer’s Privilege in California, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 155, 167 (1991) (“Their practice of tak-
ing notes and photographs, their tendency to seek out controversies, and their inde-
pendence of the disputing parties make journalists attractive and particularly credible 
witnesses.”). 
177 Editorial, The Subpoena Dilemma, COLUM. JOURN. REV., Spring 1970, at 2, 3. 
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it in time.178  This phenomenon is borne out by statistics clearly show-
ing that broadcasters receive far more subpoenas than newspapers.179  
This imbalance exists in spite of the fact that print media are generally 
thought to be more focused on hard news than are broadcast media.  
Because newspapers perform more investigations and do more in-
depth reporting, it would logically follow that they would have more 
evidence potentially relevant to court proceedings.  So why do they 
receive only a fraction of the number of subpoenas broadcasters do?  
In addition, the very nature of film evidence makes it susceptible to 
subpoenas under Justice Stewart’s (and most lower courts’) three-part 
test.180  By definition, a particular video clip is unavailable from an-
other source because it is unique.181
Third, journalists are getting better at their jobs.  The increasing 
institutionalization of the press,182 including the proliferation of both 
178 See Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1202 (noting that film is a very graphic em-
bodiment of the evidence). 
179 See AGENTS OF DISCOVERY, supra note 70, at 1, 4 (finding that in 2001, 79% of 
broadcasters received at least one subpoena while only 32% of newspapers did; in the 
same year, the average television station received 7.7 subpoenas, the average newspa-
per received 0.7 subpoenas); cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., “Or of the [Broadcast] Press,” 55 TEX. L. 
REV. 39, 39 (1976) (arguing that the broadcast media should be protected to the same 
extent as the print media). 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (discussing the three-part test from Jus-
tice Stewart’s dissent in Branzburg). 
181 See Tuley, supra note 65, at 1827 (arguing that outtakes, because they “freeze” 
an event, can never be obtained from another source and therefore are particularly 
susceptible under the three-part test).  Tuley also makes an interesting argument re-
garding judges’ “subtle bias” favoring “traditional” work product (i.e., a reporter’s 
notes) over newer work product (i.e., a camerawoman’s video outtake).  Id. at 1826.  
Judges might consider video outtakes not as editorial processes in need of First 
Amendment protection, but rather as mechanical recordings made without independ-
ent thought.  Id. at 1836.  Whereas a reporter’s personal handwritten notes involve a 
“trained eye and professional instincts” (and therefore receive more protection), out-
takes may be thought of as “indiscriminately registered information.”  Id. 
182 See Fargo, supra note 13, at 82 (noting the “growing institutionalization of the 
press and its heightened influence and wealth” in the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries).  The press as an institution has certainly changed since 1868, when 
Thomas Cooley wrote that a newspaper publisher occupied “the position in the courts 
that the village gossip and retailer of scandal occupied two hundred years ago, with no 
more privilege and no more protection.”  2 THOMAS B. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE 
STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 938 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927) (1868). 
Not all scholars think that the press has changed for the better.  See, e.g., JAMES 
FALLOWS, BREAKING THE NEWS:  HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
150 (1996) (arguing that “[ j]ournalism is not a ‘profession’” because it does not re-
quire “fixed standards for admission and mastery over a specialized field of knowl-
edge”); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 937-38 
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graduate and undergraduate programs,183 has led to higher standards 
in the profession. 
New technologies, while aiding journalists in the course of their 
jobs, also aid government officials when they seek the fruits of journal-
ists’ work.184  Smolla argues that new technologies make information 
gathered by the press significantly more valuable to the govern-
ment.185  As the press’s newsgathering ability increases with new tech-
nological development, it will simply have more information of 
value.186  In addition, the quality of the information gathered (i.e., sat-
ellite pictures, videotape, sound recordings, etc.) will increase.187
While some commentators ascribe ulterior motives to law-
enforcement officials who subpoena news organizations,188 others ar-
gue that prosecutors’ increased usage of the subpoena to access jour-
nalists’ materials reflects a changing media and investigative culture.189  
Whatever the reasons behind the phenomenon, the evidence clearly 
shows that subpoenas to news organization are significantly more 
prevalent than they were at the time Branzburg was decided,190 and ac-
tion by the courts is necessary to reverse this trend. 
2.  The Problem with Targeting the Most Prominent Organizations 
The prevailing view among commentators is that a journalist’s 
privilege is especially needed to protect small news outlets, which do 
not have the resources to constantly fight government subpoenas.191  
(1996) (arguing that journalism is not a profession because both journalists, collec-
tively, and the general public do not believe that a “professional attitude” pervades the 
field). 
183 See Bogus, supra note 182, at 933-34 (noting that today there are 414 journalism 
programs in the country, up from one in 1904, and that an “increasing number of 
journalists hold baccalaureate or master’s degrees from schools of journalism”). 
184 For a novel argument as to why a court should not compel disclosure of a tele-
vision station’s files, see Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) 
(denying a station operator’s Fourteenth Amendment due process argument). 
185 SMOLLA, supra note 159, §25:34, at 54. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1199 (“[P]utting a gag on the press may be 
as much an objective as eliciting information from it.”). 
189 See sources cited supra notes 176-183 and accompanying text. 
190 Not only are subpoenas more prevalent, but courts are finding against journal-
ists at ever-increasing rates.  See Schmid, supra note 51, at 84 (showing empirically that 
the success rates of three subpoenaing parties—criminal defendants, grand juries, and 
prosecutors—rose during the 1990s). 
191 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 752 (noting that less well-
established news outlets arguably need more protection than the established press be-
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However, the privilege is also necessary for the large, prominent me-
dia organizations, which are constantly embroiled in court battles over 
government subpoenas.192  These large news organizations have the 
resources to conduct investigations into official wrongdoing and the 
wherewithal to disseminate their findings.  Their stories are the most 
potentially damaging to the government, and arguably constitute the 
best journalism.  The government sometimes targets these media out-
lets not to obtain the evidence for a court proceeding, but rather to 
track down a source that has acted against the government’s inter-
ests.193  A journalist’s privilege is therefore needed to protect not just 
the small news outlet that cannot protect itself, but also the large news 
organization that conducts the kind of journalism that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect. 
B.  The Uncertain Nature of the Scope of the Law and the Forum  
in Which Litigation Might Arise 
A large part of a reporter’s job is speaking with people who pos-
sess relevant information.  Sometimes, due to the sensitive nature of 
certain issues, these people will not speak with a reporter unless their 
identity is kept confidential.  A reporter’s promise to keep a source’s 
identity in confidence benefits all parties involved:  the public receives 
cause the established press has sufficient political power to fight government subpoe-
nas); Hilden, supra note 55 (“[O]utside journalists—including bloggers—may be will-
ing to take aim more quickly, speak more harshly, and investigate more thoroughly 
than insider journalists . . . .”).  In addition, one can argue that established press or-
ganizations “often have ties to the local power structure that make them less willing to 
report . . . on matters that reflect unfavorably on those who control the community.”  
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 752. 
192 See, e.g., Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, Reporters and Federal 
Subpoenas ( July 7, 2005), http://www.rcfp.org/shields_and_subpoenas.html (identify-
ing the news organizations currently embroiled in subpoena disputes, among them 
some of the most prominent national newspapers (New York Times, Washington Post, San 
Francisco Chronicle), wire services (Associated Press, Reuters), television networks (ABC, 
CBS), cable networks (CNN), news magazines (Time), and radio networks (NPR)). 
193 In discussing this phenomenon, Van Gerpen asserts that 
the information [sought in a subpoena to the press] has frequently not been 
employed for the correct disposal of litigation, but rather has been used to 
track down the originator of the embarrassing exposé.  One might well ques-
tion the appropriateness of the argument for the “law’s right to everyman’s 
evidence” by investigators who pursue source disclosure for the purpose of es-
tablishing a successful cover-up operation. 
VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 12; see also Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1199 (noting that 
the government may be trying to elicit the names of a journalist’s sources for ulterior 
motives). 
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the pertinent information, the source does not face potential retribu-
tion or scorn at her job, and the reporter is able to do her job more 
effectively.  The system unravels if the reporter is unable to keep her 
promise of confidentiality:  specifically, future sources will not speak 
to that reporter; more generally, sources will be more reluctant to 
speak with reporters because they are worried that their identity will 
be made public.194  As a result, the public loses out because it will re-
ceive less relevant information with which to make informed opin-
ions.195
When sources and reporters are uncertain as to whether the 
source’s identity may be kept confidential, speech to reporters is nec-
essarily chilled.  And in today’s highly politicized atmosphere, it is 
likely that the issue of a journalist’s privilege will continue to arise in 
the context of administration leaks.196  Therefore, because of the 
patchwork of shield laws and privileges across the states and federal 
circuits, the increasing nationalization of media companies, and the 
uncertainty as to the forum in which litigation might arise, speech to 
reporters is being unnecessarily chilled.197
194 See John E. Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege:  Updating the Empirical 
Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 72-81 (1985) 
(showing empirically that sources are more likely to speak with reporters when they are 
guaranteed confidentiality); see also WOODWARD, supra note 5, at 185 (“It is critical that 
confidential sources feel they would be protected for life.”); Frank Rich, Op-Ed, We’re 
Not in Watergate Anymore, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, § 4, at 12 (asking rhetorically, “What 
high-level source would risk talking to Time about governmental corruption after this 
cave-in?”). 
195 See Comm. on Commc’ns & Media Law, supra note 82, at 227 (“Without a re-
porter’s ability to promise confidentiality, and keep that promise . . . . [i]mportant in-
formation the public relies upon would simply dry up.”). 
196 As Judge Tatel phrases it: 
[G]iven the many leaks that no doubt occur in [Washington, D.C.,] every day, 
it would be naïve to suppose that [this] will be the last [case raising the issue 
of the journalist’s privilege].  For the sake of reporters and sources whom such 
litigation may ensnare, we should take this opportunity to clarify the rules 
governing their relationship. 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 990 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
197 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (“[I]f the purpose of the privilege 
is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation ‘must be able to pre-
dict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected.  An 
uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all.’” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981))).  As a testament to the disagreement among 
judges—let alone reporters or sources—on the issue, see the majority opinion in Judith 
Miller : 
The Court is not of one mind on the existence of a common law privilege.  
Judge Sentelle would hold that there is no such common law privilege for rea-
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News organizations today are larger and more complex than they 
were thirty years ago.  The rise of media conglomerates has trans-
formed the media landscape from one of small independent organiza-
tions to one of large national corporations.198  The larger the con-
glomerate, the more likely that it is run by a businessperson, not a 
professional journalist, and therefore the more likely that it will 
quickly and cheaply accede to subpoena demands.199  While this policy 
of capitulation may be good for business, it is devastating to the role 
of journalists and the safeguards of the First Amendment.200
sons set forth in a separate opinion.  Judge Tatel would hold that there is such 
a common law privilege.  Judge Henderson believes that we need not, and 
therefore should not, reach that question. 
397 F.3d at 973. 
198 See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 27-54 (2004) (arguing 
that five conglomerates---Disney, General Electric, News Corp., Time Warner, and Via-
com---control the vast majority of the media industry); Columbia Journalism Review, 
Who Owns What?, http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) 
(compiling a database of the current media conglomerates and their holdings). 
199 See Alan M. Adelson, Have the News Media Become Too Big to Fight?, SATURDAY 
REV., Mar. 14, 1970, at 106 (arguing that corporate leaders, who are often more con-
cerned with the company’s bottom line than journalistic rights, often readily comply 
with a government subpoena instead of spending the time and money to fight it).  
Adelson made his point thirty-five years ago; today, with only five companies owning 
the lion’s share of the media market, the sentiment rings even truer. 
The Valerie Plame case offers a ready example.  After initially resisting the gov-
ernment’s subpoenas, Time magazine, which is a major subsidiary of Time Warner, one 
of the Big Five media companies, agreed to turn over reporter Matt Cooper’s notes.  
On the other hand, the New York Times, which, while admittedly large, is focused pri-
marily on journalism, continued to refuse to comply with the government’s requests, 
and journalist Judith Miller was sent to jail.  See Leonnig, supra note 50, at A2 (report-
ing that if Time continued to refuse to turn over Matt Cooper’s notes, Chief Judge Ho-
gan would “assess a retroactive fine of $270,000, which he said reflects the wealth of the 
magazine’s corporate owner, Time Warner”); id. (noting that while Cooper, the jour-
nalist, would prefer that his notes not be turned over, he recognized that Time, his em-
ployer, “had its own obligations to consider”); Rich, supra note 194, § 4, at 12 (arguing 
that media conglomerate Time Warner’s “corporate mentality” motivated Time Editor-
in-Chief Norman Pearlstine’s decision to turn over Matt Cooper’s notes and derisively 
noting that Pearlstine is a member of the board of the Committee to Protect Journal-
ists). 
200 See David A. Logan, Of “Sloppy Journalism,” “Corporate Tyranny,” and Mea Culpas:  
The Curious Case of Moldea v. New York Times, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161-62 (1995) 
(pointing out that in today’s society, free speech law is often made by powerful corpo-
rations with economic interests foremost in mind, rather than by a lonely pamphleteer 
taking on the government for a principled cause); cf. Rich, supra note 194, § 4, at 12 
(referring to Time’s acquiescence in turning over Matt Cooper’s notes to Special Coun-
sel Fitzgerald as “buckl[ing]”).  But cf. VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 28 (“[I]t is likely 
that a more deferential press would encourage even more subpoenas.”). 
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 The editors and managers of these organizations have a vested in-
terest in keeping their reporters out of court.201  To this end, they can 
develop a working knowledge of the intricacies of the relevant laws in 
each state.202  However, it is expensive and time-consuming to gather 
this information, not to mention almost impossible for reporters to 
absorb it sufficiently before talking with sources in several different 
areas of the country.  If the law of journalist’s privilege were uniform 
throughout the country, news organizations would not face these bur-
densome costs.  The law in this field as it stands today is at the height 
of uncertainty,203 for reporters cannot be sure which jurisdiction will 
subpoena them, and therefore cannot guarantee confidentiality to 
their sources.204
201 One of the traditional arguments for a journalist’s privilege is that responding 
to subpoenas is unduly time-consuming and costly, especially because “reporters are 
more susceptible to being subpoenaed than are other professionals.”  WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 721. 
In response to the burden of responding to and fighting many subpoenas, some 
news organizations have instituted policies to quickly destroy potential evidence.  See 
AGENTS OF DISCOVERY, supra note 70, at 4 (“Several surveyed newsrooms reported the 
institution of policies to destroy raw footage or reporters’ notes . . . .”); see also Cald-
well, supra note 76, at 5 (stating that in response to the subpoenas in his famous case, 
he “ripped up the notebooks . . . erased the tapes and shredded almost every docu-
ment”).  This practice raises a whole host of spoliation of evidence issues.  For an over-
view of parties’ obligations to preserve evidence (especially electronic evidence) poten-
tially relevant in future litigation, see SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST 
PRACTICES FOR ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA 
PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 11-13 (2004), available at http:// 
www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/SedonaPrinciples200401.pdf.  It is 
distressing that current judicial policy incentivizes the destruction of materials with 
significant potential usefulness. 
202 Two separate entities have tried to accomplish this daunting task.  The Practic-
ing Law Institute (PLI) publishes a comprehensive yearly guide documenting the state 
of the law of journalist’s privilege in each state and federal circuit.  Goodale et al., su-
pra note 93.  The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has commissioned 
lawyers in each state and federal circuit to synopsize the relevant law and keep it up-
dated in a comprehensive and easily searchable database.  Reporters Comm. for Free-
dom of the Press, The Reporter’s Privilege, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2005). 
203 See Zampa, supra note 6, at 1453 (arguing that “clarity in the doctrine of privi-
lege” is far more important than the actual level of protection, because journalists and 
sources will know ex ante the extent that the source’s confidentiality can be pro-
tected).  But cf. Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege:  An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. 
REV. 229, 280 (1971) (finding that journalists would prefer a statute with flexibility 
rather than certainty). 
204 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Freedom in Support of Peti-
tioners at 4-5, Miller v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005) (No. 04-1507) (“Indeed, 
given the multiplicity of conflicting rulings, newsgatherers now find they enjoy dra-
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C.  The Adversarial Relationship Between the Media and Government  
The relationship between the press and the government has 
soured.  Instead of working toward a common goal of disseminating 
relevant information to the public, government officials are becoming 
more secretive,205 which necessarily means that journalists must dig 
deeper to get to the root of stories.  In this context, the role of confi-
dential sources is paramount:  the more tight-lipped the government, 
the bigger the penalty for leaking information to a reporter,206 and the 
more relevant that information is to the public. 
In short, the press and the government view each other skepti-
cally.207  The current Bush Administration in particular has been sin-
gled out as secretive and anti-press.208  Indeed, when Senator Dodd in-
matically different First Amendment protections for their confidential news sources 
from one jurisdiction to the next, from one type of case to another, and even from 
federal to state courts.”); Leslye DeRoos Rood & Ann K. Grossman, The Case for a Fed-
eral Journalist’s Testimonial Shield Statute, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 779, 782 (1991) 
(“Uniformity of the protection afforded is essential to the free flow of information to 
the public.”); Alger, supra note 176, at 161 (“Only an omniscient reporter could know 
prospectively when he or she agrees to keep a secret whether, and in what kind of pro-
ceeding, he or she will be subpoenaed.”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Comment, Constitutional 
Protection for the Newsman’s Work Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 122 (1970) (not-
ing the problem faced by “nationwide news networks who gather news in all states and 
are subject to subpoenas in any jurisdiction to which their operations extend”); Fargo, 
supra note 13, at 487 (“Journalists working on stories do not know, when they are gath-
ering information, whether they will be subpoenaed or, if so, in what court.”). 
205 See Rebecca Carr, Study:  Feds’ Secrecy Grows, Gets Costlier; Critics Say Loss of Access 
Hurts Public, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 4, 2005, at A3, available at 2005 WLNR 13934304 
(reporting on the increase in the number of documents the federal government classi-
fies). 
206 See, e.g., Jim VandeHei & Mike Allen, Bush Raises Threshold for Firing Aides in Leak 
Probe, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at A1 (noting that President Bush stated he would fire 
anyone who leaked the information in the Valerie Plame case). 
207 See Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 23, at 174 (“[P]resent atti-
tudes of the press toward the Supreme Court strongly suggest the complete absence of 
an enterprise shared by the press and the Supreme Court.”); id. (“I detect in the pre-
sent controversy a new and disturbing note of acrimony, almost bitterness.”). 
208 See Hertzberg, supra note 8, at 28 (“[T]he Bush Administration . . . is notori-
ously secretive, manipulative, and vindictive to journalists who fail to bend the knee.”); 
Eric Boehlert, Tearing Down the Press, SALON.COM, Mar. 2, 2005, http:// 
www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/02/media/index_np.html (arguing that the 
Bush White House is “trying to weaken the press” because the press as “an institution 
[is] structurally an adversary of the White House”).  But see Howard Kurtz, Is Bush  
Targeting the Media?, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 3, 2005, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3421-2005Mar3.html (“I would argue that 
nothing the [Bush] White House has done has damaged the media’s credibility more 
than what the profession has done to itself.”). 
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troduced a bill to enact a federal shield law, he stated that it was nec-
essary because “[w]e . . . are entering very, very dangerous territory 
indeed for our democracy” due to the soured relationship between 
the media and the government.209
When the government respects the role of a free press in a consti-
tutional democracy, the need for protections for journalists wanes.  
However, when the government seeks to control the flow of informa-
tion, subpoenas journalists at increasing rates, and adopts a more ad-
versarial stance toward the press, the need for protections for journal-
ists waxes.210  Our country is at a point at which press freedoms are 
being infringed by overzealous prosecutors, and it is the role of the 
judiciary to come to the aid of the press and recognize a privilege for 
journalists. 
D.  The Increasing Number of Journalists Being Held in Contempt 
When a reporter refuses a subpoena to provide testimony or sub-
mit evidence, a court has limited options:  the court can excuse the 
reporter from compliance or hold the reporter in contempt.211  A con-
tempt holding usually carries jail time for the reporter and a fine for 
her organization.212  These contempt holdings are not supposed to be 
retributive, though;213 the purpose in jailing a reporter is to elicit rele-
209 Joseph Straw, Dodd Bill Shields Press from Reprisals, NEW HAVEN REGISTER, Nov. 
20, 2004, http://www.nhregister.com (internal quotation marks omitted). 
210 See Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1202 (attributing the rising number of subpoe-
nas to the more adversarial positions of the press and the government). 
211 When the media organization is a party to the suit, the court has more options.  
For instance, in one civil libel action, the court held that if the newspaper failed to 
identify its confidential source, then it would be presumed that no source actually ex-
isted.  See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 887 (D. Haw. 1981) (“[W]e hold 
that when a defendant in a libel action, brought by a plaintiff who is required to prove 
actual malice under New York Times, refuses to declare his sources of information . . . 
there shall arise a presumption that the defendant had no source.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Downing v. Monitor Publ’g Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1193, 1195 (N.H. 1980))). 
212 See, e.g., In re Special Counsel Investigation, Misc. No. 04-407 (TFH) (D.D.C. 
Oct. 7, 2004), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/04-407.pdf (holding New York 
Times reporter Judith Miller in contempt for failing to provide testimony to a grand 
jury, and ordering her “confined to a suitable place” for no more than eighteen 
months), aff’d sub nom, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 976 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); Adam Liptak, Reporter from Time Is 
Held in Contempt in C.I.A. Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2004, at A1 (noting the court’s 
decision to hold Time reporter Matthew Cooper in contempt, order him to jail, and 
fine the magazine $1000 a day). 
213 However, Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald seemed to imply that he wanted 
reporter Judith Miller jailed, not to convince her to testify, but for punitive reasons:  
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vant information from her.214  As soon as the information is no longer 
relevant—the reporter testifies, the case settles, the grand jury’s term 
expires, etc.—she is released.215  This begs the question:  If a judge is 
certain that a reporter will never testify, how can the judge in good 
conscience send her to jail? 
When reporters actually do go to jail,216 it is the sad result of a 
game of chicken—and a clash of egos—gone terribly wrong.  Judges 
must maintain an orderly courtroom; if a judge orders someone to 
provide testimony and is rebuffed, the judge—and the judiciary as a 
whole—is perceived as weak.  The next person who does not want to 
accede to the judge’s demands will be that much more emboldened.  
Therefore, the judge often follows through on her threat to jail the 
journalist primarily to “send a message” that her orders must be re-
spected, no matter what the opposition.217
On the other hand, a reporter instinctively fights any effort to ob-
tain her confidential information because she thinks that sources will 
stop confiding in her if word gets out that she cannot keep confi-
dences.  More generally, the reporter, not unlike the judge, wants to 
“‘[W]e can’t have 50,000 journalists’ deciding when to reveal sources.”  Peter Johnson 
& Mark Memmott, Time Reporter to Testify; N.Y. Times Reporter Jailed, USA TODAY, July 7, 
2005, at 5A, available at 2005 WLNR 10629658. 
214 See id. (quoting Chief Judge Hogan as stating that “[t]here is still a realistic pos-
sibility that confinement might cause her [Miller] to testify”). 
215 See Carol D. Leonnig, 2 Reporters in Leak Case Given 48 Hours to Argue Against Jail-
ing, WASH. POST, June 30, 2005, at A2 (noting that Judith Miller’s jail term is set to ex-
pire when the current grand jury’s term is over in October 2005). 
216 See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, supra note 4 (keeping an up-to-
date listing of reporters who were jailed over the past twenty years for refusing to tes-
tify); see, e.g., Liptak, supra note 3, at A1 (noting Judith Miller’s jailing by Chief Judge 
Hogan for failing to provide testimony to Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald in his investiga-
tion into the disclosure of CIA agent Valerie Plame’s name); Zuckerman, supra note 82 
(noting that Miami Herald reporter David Kidwell spent time in jail for refusing to tes-
tify in a murder trial); AGENTS OF DISCOVERY, supra note 70, at 3 (noting one reporter’s 
recent 168-day jail term for refusing to disclose her source).  But see WRIGHT & GRA-
HAM, supra note 50, §5426, at 717 (arguing that the number of journalists who have 
been jailed is relatively small compared with the number of run-ins journalists have 
had with courts). 
217 However, the sentence is often light and is imposed more for appearance’s 
sake.  See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 717 (“Indeed, it has been sug-
gested that the ritual jailing of reporters for short terms was a form of fiction in which 
journalists were granted a de facto privilege by sympathetic judges who were unwilling 
to diminish their own powers by the creation of a de jure privilege.”).  As is expected, 
not all commentators are satisfied with this “ritual.”  See, e.g., BATES, supra note 7, at 12-
13 (arguing that this “ritual jailing . . . carries a significant cost,” because “others will 
find it that much easier to rationalize lawlessness for venal reasons”). 
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uphold the ideals of her profession and ensure that it continues to be 
respected.  When the case reaches its climax in court, it receives great 
publicity, and at this point neither side wishes to be seen by the public 
as backing down.  The judge feels compelled to follow through on her 
threat to jail the reporter; the reporter feels compelled to follow 
through on her promise never to disclose the confidential informa-
tion.  The result is a jailed journalist and a judge who still has not ob-
tained the relevant information.   
It is hard to determine the winner—judge or journalist—after 
such a confrontation.  Though journalists, like most citizens, probably 
loathe going to jail, some treat their sentences as badges of honor and 
defining moments in their careers or lives, and are exalted as martyrs 
in the eyes of their peers and the public.218  In addition, the public—
and newspapers’ editorial pages—are often galvanized and roundly 
condemn the judiciary.219  The judiciary, on the other hand, continues 
to be respected by the public and feared by journalists who might en-
counter such a situation in the future.  Respect for the rule of law lives 
to see another day.  In the short term, though, a journalist sits in jail 
and a judge is left without the necessary evidence.  Both sides lose. 
218 See Ervin, supra note 148, at 257 (noting that when “martyred newsmen” went to 
jail for refusing to disclose their source, the issue was dramatized and the public gen-
erally came to their support); see, e.g., TORRE, supra note 98 (chronicling her own rise 
to fame and the unending support from fellow journalists after her legal dispute); 
Howard Kurtz, Contempt & Praise for Reporter, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at C1 (quot-
ing an editor of the Columbia Journalism Review as saying that a certain reporter facing 
jail time for refusing to disclose her source was “being cast in the role of journalistic 
martyr” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (quoting an editor of the National Re-
view as stating that by accepting jail time for refusing to disclose her source, a reporter 
“helps burnish her credentials, and deservedly so, as a serious journalist who’s sticking 
up for her principles” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But see Carol D. Leonnig, 
Time Reporter’s Testimony Sought:  Prosecutor Tries to Force Cooperation, WASH. POST, July 6, 
2005, at A3 (quoting Special Counsel Fitzgerald as calling Judith Miller’s refusal to tes-
tify “irresponsible martyrdom” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
219 See, e.g., Op-Ed, Attack on a Free Press, S.F. CHRON., July 7, 2005, at B8 (“By jailing 
New York Times reporter Judith Miller, federal judges and prosecutors have sent a chill-
ing message to all journalists and Americans:  Freedom of the press and the public’s 
right to know are under attack.”); Editorial, If the Next Deep Throat Clams Up, OREGO-
NIAN, July 1, 2005, at E6, available at 2005 WLNR 10441643 (“Democracy . . . is in trou-
ble. . . .  [Citizens] can’t afford a free press that’s only free enough to write stories of 
no consequence.”); Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, Our Not-So-Free Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2004, at A25 (equating the United States to China and Zimbabwe for “throwing 
journalists in prison”); Editorial, Press Imprisoned:  Jailing Reporter Is No Way To Achieve 
Justice, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 9, 2005, at B6 (“The imprisonment of Judith 
Miller is shameful. . . .  [T]he principal casualty so far in the whole case is America’s 
press freedom.”). 
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A journalist’s privilege would prevent—or at least mitigate—such 
a sad conclusion to the conflict between two professionals both at-
tempting to uphold the integrity of their profession. 
IV.  JUDICIAL ANTAGONISM TOWARD A JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
A.  Why Judges Are Traditionally Opposed to the Idea 
Judges are typically opposed to privileges—all privileges—because 
they hinder the search for truth.220  This Part explores some examples 
of the judiciary’s difficulty with a potential press privilege.221
While thirty-two states have shield laws,222 reflecting the wishes of 
the legislative branch, judges in many of those states have narrowed 
the application of those laws.223  In Florida, for example, a court held 
that the shield law did not apply to eyewitness observations or physical 
evidence of a crime, and instituted a four-part, testimony-friendly test 
for overcoming the privilege in criminal cases.224
220 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (“[E]xceptions to the de-
mand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for 
they are in derogation of the search for truth.”); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th 
Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (“[T]here has been a notable hostility on the part of the judici-
ary to recognizing new privileges.” (citing MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 77 (2d ed. 1972))); Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 169 F.R.D. 80, 83 
(M.D. La. 1996) (“[P]rivileges are strongly disfavored in federal practice . . . .”); Fargo, 
supra note 13, at 189 (“Privileges generally are suspect to legal authorities because they 
are counter-intuitive in a system designed to arrive at the truth.”); see also CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES:  TEXT, CASES, AND 
PROBLEMS 757 (5th ed. 2004) (“[Privileges] are intended to protect certain societal 
relationships and values, even though such protection may impose significant costs 
upon the litigation process.  Their effect in any given trial may be to impede the search 
for the truth.”). 
221 Non-legal arguments against recognition of a privilege for journalists include 
journalists’ tendency to sensationalize, the belief that no one is “above the law,” the 
definitional problem of deciding who qualifies as a journalist, and the possibility that a 
privilege would give journalists too much (undeserved) power in our society.  For an 
overview of these arguments, see Karl H. Schmid, Journalist’s Privilege in Criminal Pro-
ceedings:  An Analysis of United States Courts of Appeals’ Decisions from 1973 to 1999, 39 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1458-60 (2002). 
222 See supra note 120 (listing the states’ statutes). 
223 See VAN GERPEN, supra note 6, at 145 (“Judges often narrow the application of 
statutes beyond what appears to have been the intent of the legislature.”); WRIGHT & 
GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 734 (noting that significant judicial hostility to the 
idea has led to the narrowing of many of the shield laws). 
224 See Florida v. Davis, 720 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. 1998) (“The privilege not to dis-
close relevant evidence obviously constitutes an extraordinary exception to the general 
duty to testify.” (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. Morejon, 561 So. 2d 577, 581 
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In addition, some judges may be opposed to a press privilege be-
cause of what they see as a deterioration of news coverage.  In today’s 
world of twenty-four-hour cable news networks, competition has 
forced many media outlets to sensationalize their coverage of events, 
especially of trials.  Judges’ reactions to these “media circuses”225 may 
be to curtail some of the privileges normally afforded the press.226
Some commentators ascribe to the courts a perfectly legitimate 
jurisprudential reason for not being receptive to a press privilege.  For 
example, Professor Anthony Fargo explains that courts are reluctant 
to grant journalists special privileges because, under current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, if the media were granted special access rights or 
privileges to disregard subpoenas, then every person would have to 
have the same rights.227  This would in effect destroy some other vital 
press protections. 
Finally, the debate over press privileges might be considered one 
between two institutions, each of which thinks it is best suited to rep-
resent the interests of the people.  The judiciary has long held itself 
out as protecting the best interests of society, especially through its ad-
judicative procedures.  The press has also long claimed to represent 
(Fla. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Laurence B. Alexander & Anthony 
L. Fargo, Sources of Protection:  A Case Study of the Evolution of the Common Law and Statu-
tory Journalist’s Privilege, 37 FREE SPEECH Y.B. 17, 34 (1999) (describing Florida’s four-
prong test and why it limits the scope of the privilege). 
225 See JON BRUSCHKE & WILLIAM E. LOGES, FREE PRESS VS. FAIR TRIALS:  EXAMINING 
PUBLICITY’S ROLE IN TRIAL OUTCOMES 1 (2004) (“The media circus that appears at so 
many trials these days needs a ringmaster to balance the rights of the media and the 
accused.” (quoting J.A. Walton, From O.J. to Tim McVeigh and Beyond:  The Supreme 
Court’s Totality of Circumstances Test as Ringmaster in the Expanding Media Circus, 75 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 549, 588 (1998))). 
226 See Fargo, supra note 13, at 22 (“[ J]udges have become less sympathetic to the 
press, in part because of what they see as sensational trial coverage.” (citing HOLLI 
HARTMAN, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS, THE EROSION OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE 
4-5, 9 (1997))).  This charge against the press is not new.  Professor Christopher Tied-
man wrote in 1886 that the press had too much power and tended to publish “sensa-
tional, and oftener false, accounts of individual wrongs and immoralities.”  CHRISTO-
PHER G. TIEDMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN THE 
UNITED STATES 190 (Lawbook Exchange 2001) (1886). 
227 See Fargo, supra note 13, at 163 (“If the media have special access rights to 
places and information or a privilege not to reveal information when faced with a 
properly issued subpoena, then everyone does.”).  Fargo notes that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has its upsides for the press, too:  “if town gossips could not be gagged, 
neither could the press.”  Id. at 175. 
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“the people.”  The clash between these two institutions may therefore 
be seen as a battle for power.228
B.  The Supreme Court’s Specific Opposition in Branzburg 
The Court’s opinion in Branzburg demanded empirical evidence 
of the “chilling effect”229 on communications between sources and 
journalists.230  This demand was without merit and epitomized the 
Court’s antagonism toward the idea of press privileges.  In contrast, 
the Supreme Court in several other cases has accepted at face value 
the premise that certain governmental actions would unnecessarily 
chill important First Amendment rights.231
In addition, assuming arguendo that the Court requires proof of 
the chilling effect, today that proof exists.  Only two years after the 
Court decided against a privilege in Branzburg, it found an executive 
privilege in United States v. Nixon.232  The irony is that the Court readily 
accepted the idea that necessary communications between the Presi-
dent and his advisors would be unduly chilled without such a privi-
228 See Allen, supra note 20, at 49 (arguing that the debate over a journalist’s privi-
lege “is really a battle over which institution—the courts or the press—is best qualified 
to be the public’s representative”). 
229 Some commentators note that the “chilling effect” can cut both ways.  See, e.g., 
BATES, supra note 7, at 12 (arguing that because of the press’s unique power to make 
its “screams of pain heard,” prosecutors are reluctant to pressure the press too hard or 
too often with subpoenas, and are therefore “chill[ed]” in their investigatory efforts 
(quoting Michael Kinsley, The Press Doesn’t Own the First Amendment, in MEDIA VOICES:  
DEBATING CRITICAL ISSUES IN MASS MEDIA 148 (George McKenna ed., 1982))). 
230 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972) (claiming that “the evi-
dence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow of 
news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule 
regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen,” and further emphasizing the 
speculative nature of the effectiveness of subpoenas). 
231 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996) (“If the privilege were re-
jected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would 
surely be chilled.”); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965) (holding that a 
Maryland law requiring motion pictures to be shown to the state before being exhib-
ited to the public had a “potentially chilling effect” on free speech); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (holding that a state statute requiring prospective public 
school teachers to disclose their associational ties had a “tendency to chill” teachers’ 
freedom of expression and association); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 
(1959) (requiring no evidence to support its conclusion that a bookseller would be 
chilled from selling books if he could be criminally liable for possession of obscene 
books). 
232 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); see SMOLLA, supra note 159, § 25:21, at 38 n.5 (noting 
that the Court in Nixon found deterrence “not by reason of empirical evidence, but 
rather because of what ‘human experience teaches’”). 
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lege.  The Court failed to show the same deference in Branzburg to the 
“human experience” that explains why confidential sources are less 
likely to divulge information to journalists if the journalists can be 
forced to identify the source. 
Further supporting his position denying a press privilege, Justice 
White expressed the fear in Branzburg that if the definition of “news-
man” was too broad, criminal groups could set up “sham” newspapers 
in order to shield themselves from grand jury inquiry.233  The authors 
of an influential treatise on federal practice mock this idea:  “Perhaps 
in law school examinations one finds criminals who publish accounts 
of their misdeeds in order to claim the newsmen’s privilege when 
called to testify before the grand jury,” but despite exhaustive re-
search, the authors “failed to turn up a single instance that even re-
motely resembles the hypothesis.”234  It is ironic that Justice White 
based his opposition to a journalist’s privilege on a lack of empirical 
evidence regarding the chilling of the press and yet relied on this far-
fetched hypothetical without any empirical support. 
In short, the Court’s insistence in Branzburg on solid empirical 
evidence was without merit.235  Further, even if empirical evidence is 
needed to convince the Court that speech is chilled without a privi-
lege, that evidence is now available.  The Supreme Court was not con-
tent in Branzburg to rely on Professor Blasi’s comprehensive study.236  
233 408 U.S. at 705 n.40.  Judge Sentelle offers his own version, updated since 
Branzburg’s time, of a hypothetical that would threaten to swallow the whole privilege: 
[W]ould it not be possible for a government official wishing to engage in the 
sort of unlawful leaking under investigation in the present controversy to call 
a trusted friend or a political ally, advise him to set up a web log (which I un-
derstand takes about three minutes) and then leak to him under a promise of 
confidentiality the information which the law forbids the official to disclose? 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979-80 (D.C. Cir.) (Sentelle, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
234 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 753 & n.21. 
235 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have never before 
demanded that First Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical studies demon-
strating beyond any conceivable doubt that deterrent effects exist . . . .”); Neubauer, 
supra note 156, at 173-74 (arguing that the “Branzburg majority relied too heavily on a 
quantitative rather than a qualitative analysis,” given that the most important types of 
stories are precisely those that require a privilege for journalists). 
236 See 408 U.S. at 694 (refusing to give weight to Blasi’s study because “surveys of 
reporters on this topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and must 
be viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the interviewees”).  Blasi’s 
study, cited in Branzburg as a paper entitled “Press Subpoenas:  An Empirical and Legal 
Analysis, Study Report of the Reporters’ Committee on Freedom of the Press,” id. at 
694 n.33, was later published as “The Newsman’s Privilege:  An Empirical Study” in the 
Michigan Law Review.  Blasi, supra note 209. 
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But two studies since then, one by Boston lawyer John Osborn237 and 
one by Professor Laurence Alexander,238 have shown that news infor-
mants are dissuaded from divulging information to reporters, and that 
reporters are less likely to pursue such stories, if there is not a high 
degree of certainty that the confidentiality cannot be pierced. 
Regardless of the empirical findings, the fact remains that proving 
a “chilling effect” is an elusive task, and one that the Supreme Court 
has not required in other First Amendment contexts.  A privilege for 
journalists should receive the same treatment from the Court. 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RECOGNIZE A JOURNALIST’S PRIVILEGE 
GROUNDED IN THE COMMON LAW 
In light of the actions and statements of lower courts, commenta-
tors, foreign courts, state legislatures, and Congress, the Supreme 
Court should recognize a journalist’s privilege under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501.239
Rule 501 refers to the “principles of the common law as they may 
be interpreted by the courts of the United States.”240  The common 
law is a changing, evolving concept, and the framers of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence wanted the rules to have the flexibility to adapt with 
the times.241  Congress specifically rejected the Supreme Court’s pro-
237 Osborn, supra note 194. 
238 Alexander et al., supra note 174. 
239 FED. R. EVID. 501 provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by 
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of 
the United States in the light of reason and experience. 
For an interpretation of Congress’s possible intentions in enacting Rule 501, see 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
501:  The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. 
REV. 511, 517-23 (1994). 
240 FED. R. EVID. 501; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing that in habeas 
corpus proceedings, courts should look only to precedent as established by the Su-
preme Court, and not to other courts’ interpretations). 
241 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1996) (“Rule [501] thus did not freeze 
the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our 
history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the evolutionary development 
of testimonial privileges.’”(quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980))); 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 50, § 5426, at 712 n.4 (quoting Congressman Hungate 
as saying that “[t]he language of Rule 501 permits the courts to develop a privilege for 
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posed rule regarding privileges (which would have created nine spe-
cific privileges)242 and instead implemented this flexible rule.243
The Supreme Court interpreted Rule 501 in Jaffee v. Redmond 
when it recognized a privilege for psychotherapist-patient communi-
cations.244  The Court looked to the states for guidance on the issue, 
and used the fact that all fifty states recognized the privilege as sup-
port for its own conclusion.245  Support for the privilege was not as 
strong in the federal courts; while two circuit courts explicitly recog-
nized the privilege, four circuit courts explicitly declined to do so.246  
The Court also reasoned that if it failed to grant the privilege, the in-
tentions of the state legislatures would be frustrated.247  Finally, the 
Court relied on the fact that a psychotherapist-patient privilege was 
newspaper-people on a case-by-case basis,” consistent with the principles of the com-
mon law (citing 120 CONG. REC. 40890, 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep. Hungate))). 
242 See Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 501-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-58 (1972) 
(proposing to protect (1) certain reports required by statute, (2) attorney-client com-
munications, (3) psychotherapist-patient communications, (4) husband-wife commu-
nications, (5) clergyman-penitent communications, (6) political votes, (7) trade se-
crets, (8) state secrets, and (9) government-informer communications). 
243 FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Seth M.M. Stodder, Retool-
ing the Federal Common-Law Reporter’s Privilege, COMM. LAW., Spring 1999, at 1, 25 (“The 
legislative history of Rule 501 manifests that its flexible language was designed to en-
compass, inter alia, a reporter’s privilege not to disclose a source.” (quoting Riley v. 
City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3rd Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted))); Imwinkelried, supra note 239, at 542 (“Congress did not freeze federal privilege 
law.  Rule 501 does not preclude the recognition of novel privileges . . . .”). 
244 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).  The decision, however, was not unanimous, and Justice 
Scalia wrote in dissent that the Court had failed to be the guardian of the judiciary’s 
truth-seeking mission:  “There is no self-interested organization out there devoted to 
pursuit of the truth in the federal courts.  The expectation is, however, that this Court 
will have that interest prominently—indeed, primarily—in mind.  Today we have failed 
that expectation, and that responsibility.”  Id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
245 See id. at 12 (“That it is appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a psycho-
therapist privilege under Rule 501 is confirmed by the fact that all 50 States and the 
District of Columbia have enacted into law some form of psychotherapist privilege.”); 
see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-17 (2002) (noting that the fact that thirty-
one states have laws prohibiting the banned practice of executing mentally retarded 
offenders “reflects widespread judgment” among the states). 
246 See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 7 (listing the stances of the courts of appeals that had con-
sidered the issue). 
247 Id. at 13.  The Court elaborated: 
[G]iven the importance of the patient’s understanding that her communica-
tions with her therapist will not be publicly disclosed, any State’s promise of 
confidentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the privi-
lege would not be honored in a federal court.  Denial of the federal privilege 
therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was enacted 
to foster these confidential communications. 
Id. 
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among the nine proposed privileges of the Judicial Conference Advi-
sory Committee (which were rejected by Congress in favor of the cur-
rent open-ended Rule 501).248
The parallels between the support for a journalist’s privilege and a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege are apparent:  almost all states rec-
ognize the journalist’s privilege249 and most federal courts of appeals 
recognize it.250  Furthermore, the lack of a journalist’s privilege at the 
federal level frustrates the interests of more than thirty state legisla-
tures and several more state supreme courts, all of which have recog-
nized the important societal interest in protecting journalists’ 
sources.251  As was the case in Jaffee, “any State’s promise of confidenti-
ality would have little value if the patient”---here, substitute “confiden-
tial news source”---“were aware that the privilege would not be hon-
ored in a federal court.”252  The Court plugged the loophole that 
allowed the confidential information to be attained simply by chang-
ing the forum (i.e., by bringing suit in federal court).253  Finally, the 
public interests served by the journalist’s privilege—an informed citi-
zenry and a check on government abuse—far outweigh the more lim-
ited and personal interests served by the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege.254
248 Id. at 14-15; see also Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 501-510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
230-58 (1972) (proposing to protect psychotherapist-patient communications).  A jour-
nalist’s privilege was not included in that original list of nine.  Id. 
249 For purposes of consensus on the issue, it is of little consequence that the state 
shield laws differ in their scope.  See, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 14 n.13 (“These variations 
in the scope of the protection are too limited to undermine the force of the States’ 
unanimous judgment that some form of psychotherapist privilege is appropriate.”). 
250 Nine circuits have explicitly recognized a journalist’s privilege.  See supra notes 
103-111 and accompanying text (listing and discussing the cases).  In comparison, only 
two circuits recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege pre-Jaffee.  See 518 U.S. at 7 
(listing the courts). 
251 Indeed, the attorneys general of thirty-four states filed an amicus brief asking 
the Supreme Court to recognize a federal reporter’s privilege, arguing that the ab-
sence of federal protection undermines the intent of the states.  See Brief Amici Curiae 
of the States of Oklahoma et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3-5, Miller v. United States, 
125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (No. 04-1507), available at http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/ 
State_AG_brief_Plame.pdf (“The lack of a corresponding federal reporter’s privilege 
undermines these vital state interests [in promoting a free society and an informed 
citizenry].”). 
252 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13. 
253 This is more applicable to civil suits; the forum for criminal prosecutions is, of 
course, more fixed. 
254 See Boutrous & Stodder, supra note 243, at 23 (“[W]hile the psychotherapist-
patient’s privilege serves ‘the mental health of our citizenry,’ . . . the reporter’s privi-
lege serves the health of our democracy . . . .”). 
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One case study from Florida highlights the positive effect that the 
passage of a shield law had on the press and judiciary in the state.255  
The authors of the case study analyze the state of the case law prior to 
the statutory enactment of a journalist’s privilege law and argue that 
reporters—and lawyers and judges—were “confus[ed] about the ex-
tent of the journalist’s privilege” due to “contradictory appellate court 
rulings.”256  The new law—and the state supreme court’s pronounce-
ment on that law—has made journalists more certain about their legal 
standing when engaging in certain activities and has helped alleviate 
needless subpoena confrontations and jailing of reporters.257  The re-
searchers’ findings can be extrapolated to the national stage:  because 
of contradictory appellate court rulings and confusion over when a 
state shield law applies, journalists—and lawyers and judges—are un-
sure of the legal status of privilege claims.  This leads to worse journal-
ism and needless confrontations between the press and the judiciary.  
If society is to have any hope of restoring the relationship between the 
press and the judiciary, a greater degree of certainty is required. 
Since Branzburg was decided, commentators have recognized that 
lower courts are without guidance on the issue of a journalist’s privi-
lege and have called for the Supreme Court to make a more precise 
pronouncement.258  Most commentators are in agreement that the 
courts, because they are closer to the issue, are better suited to make a 
decision than is Congress.259  Indeed, Congress, in promulgating Rule 
501, basically asked the courts to be the arbiters of privileges.260
255 Alexander & Fargo, supra note 224, at 35. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
258 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 405 F.3d 17, 18 (D.C. Cir.) (en 
banc) (Tatel, J., concurring) (“Only the Supreme Court can limit or distinguish 
Branzburg on [facts similar to a reporter refusing to identify a confidential source to a 
grand jury].”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith 
Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir.) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (“I think it remains the 
prerogative of the Supreme Court rather than inferior federal tribunals to determine 
whether these changes are sufficient to warrant an overruling of the Court’s rejection 
of such a common law privilege in Branzburg.”), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005); see 
also George M. Killenberg, Branzburg Revisited:  The Struggle to Define Newsman’s Privilege 
Goes On, 55 JOURN. Q. 703, 710 (1978) (“[I]n absence of a more precise decision by the 
United States Supreme Court, the boundaries of newsmen’s privilege will continue to 
be drawn case by case in the lower courts by ad hoc balancing.”). 
259 See Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creating Evidentiary Privileges:  An Argument for 
the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REV. 771, 771 (1999) (arguing for judicial, rather 
than legislative, recognition of evidentiary privileges); see also Ervin, supra note 148, at 
277-78 (concluding that judicial enforcement of the First Amendment, rather than 
federal legislation, might be the soundest recourse to protect the press’s freedom); 
Sherwood, supra note 59, at 1250 (“Newsman’s privilege is a constitutional issue; one 
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The common law represents the development of an understand-
ing among the courts about the current state of the law.  As is tradi-
tional for evidentiary issues, the understanding of the common law 
“bubbles up” from the bottom, from the courts that are presented 
with the issue most often.  Over time, this mass of lower court deci-
sions percolates upward.  Then the Supreme Court is given the oppor-
tunity to comment on the state of the law in the lower courts, and, 
more importantly, to provide them guidance so that the law can de-
velop uniformly in the various jurisdictions. 
The time has come for the Supreme Court to take this step in the 
area of journalist’s privilege law.  Thirty-two states have recognized the 
privilege by statute,261 and eighteen more by judicial means.  Nine of 
the circuits have also explicitly recognized the privilege.262  Legislators 
continue to introduce legislation, and Congress continues to consider 
enacting federal protections.  One commentator (an Assistant U.S. At-
torney), who is firmly opposed to a journalist’s privilege for nonconfi-
dential information,263 freely admits that the “federal common law 
that belongs in the courts.”).  But see Rood & Grossman, supra note 204, at 782 (argu-
ing that it is important that a reporter’s privilege at the federal level be developed by 
the legislature, and not the judiciary, because “the creation of testimonial privilege en-
tails the weighing of competing policy interests, which is a legislative and not a judicial 
function”).  Rood and Grossman give three reasons why the legislature must craft the 
law:  first, the judiciary must remain independent from the “influences of the political 
fray;” second, separation of powers would be maintained; and third, a statute would 
provide for more uniformity and clarity than a judicially created rule.  Id. 
260 See Imwinkelried, supra note 239, at 530-35 (showing that Congress, in enacting 
Rule 501, reached a “political compromise,” and therefore did not provide any useful 
guidance to the courts on whether they should be receptive or hostile to privilege 
claims). 
261 Whether a state recognizes the privilege legislatively or judicially is irrelevant.  
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996) (“It is of no consequence that recognition 
of the privilege in the vast majority of States is the product of legislative action rather 
than judicial decision.  Although common-law rulings may once have been the primary 
source of new developments in federal privilege law, that is no longer the case.”). 
262 Indeed, since almost immediately after Branzburg was handed down, lower 
courts have been finding the privilege in various circumstances.  See, e.g., Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (declaring, only five years after 
Branzburg, that the existence of a press “privilege is no longer in doubt”).  Some of the 
courts of appeals have even explicitly recognized the journalist’s privilege in the com-
mon law, as provided in Rule 501.  See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 
146 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[ J]ournalists have a federal common-law qualified privilege aris-
ing under Fed. R. Evid. 501 to refuse to divulge their confidential sources.”). 
263 See Christopher J. Clark, The Recognition of a Qualified Privilege for Non-Confidential 
Journalistic Materials:  Good Intentions, Bad Law, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 369, 377-79 (1999) 
(criticizing the authors of Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 186 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998), 
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provides . . . a qualified privilege” for confidential materials.264  In-
deed, Judge Tatel, though voting to affirm the contempt citations of 
two prominent reporters, declared:  “I believe that the consensus of 
forty-nine states plus the District of Columbia—and even the Depart-
ment of Justice—would require us to protect reporters’ sources as a 
matter of federal common law . . . .”265
CONCLUSION 
The case for a journalist’s privilege has been significantly 
strengthened since Branzburg was decided over thirty years ago, and 
the time has come for the Supreme Court to recognize this important 
privilege as part of the common law.  The interests of the press have 
been neglected (at the unneeded expense of government) for too 
long.  As Thomas Jefferson famously wrote: 
The basis of our government[] being the opinion of the people, the very 
first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspa-
pers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the 
latter.
266
The Supreme Court should not hesitate a moment in performing this 
vital task. 
*      *      * 
POSTSCRIPT 
Judith Miller was released from jail on September 29, 2005,267 
shortly after this Comment went to press.  After being personally as-
sured by her confidential source, Vice President Cheney’s Chief of 
which granted equal protection for journalists’ confidential and nonconfidential mate-
rials, for making “bad law”). 
264 Id. at 377.  The state of the common law in this area has certainly changed since 
Branzburg’s time.  See Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416, 417 (D. 
Mass. 1957) (denying the privilege on common law grounds); Guest & Stanzler, supra 
note 17, at 56 (“[C]ourts are not going to find a newsman’s privilege under the com-
mon law.”). 
265 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 986-87 (D.C. Cir.) 
(Tatel, J., concurring), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005). 
266 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington ( Jan. 16, 1787), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1 JANUARY TO 6 AUGUST 1787, at 49 ( Julian P. Boyd ed., 
1955). 
267  David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free From Jail; She Will Testify, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1. 
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Staff I. Lewis Libby, that her silence on the issue was no longer neces-
sary, Miller struck a deal with Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald to 
provide limited testimony to the federal grand jury investigating the 
Valerie Plame leak.268  Miller apparently spent over twelve weeks in jail 
in part because her and her lawyers were unsure of the sincerity of 
Lewis’s “waiver” of confidentiality.269
As of this writing, the extent of Miller’s testimony and the impact 
it will have on Fitzgerald’s investigation remain unclear.  However, the 
lesson that can be drawn from this saga is clear:  a reporter spent 
three months in jail because she, her sources, her lawyers, a federal 
prosecutor, a district judge, and the D.C. Circuit could not come to a 
conclusion about whether a journalist’s privilege exists in the com-
mon law.  The Supreme Court urgently needs to clarify the law in this 
area.  
 
 
268  Id. 
269  For a demonstration of the confusion among Miller, her lawyer, Libby, his law-
yer, and Fitzgerald about whether a waiver was offered, whether that waiver was volun-
tary, when such a waiver was offered, and when that offer was communicated to Miller, 
see Letter from I. Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff, Vice President Cheney, to Judith Miller, 
Reporter, New York Times (Sept. 15, 2005), Letter from Joseph A. Tate, Partner, 
Dechert LLP, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel (Sept. 16, 2005), and Letter 
from Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, to Joseph A. Tate, Partner, 
Dechert LLP (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ 
national/nat_MILLER_051001.pdf. 
